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ARTICLES 
DOES THE RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION INCLUDE 
'l'HE RIGHT TO ENSURE THE DEATH OF THE FETUS? 
Stephen G. Gilles * 
"Freedom to choose what is to happen to one's body is one thing; 
freedom to insist on the death of a being that is capable of living 
outside one's body is another. At present these two are inextricably 
linked, and so the woman's freedom to choose conflicts head-on 
with the alleged right to life of the fetus. When ectogenesis [gesta-
tion in an artificial womb] becomes possible, these two issues will 
break apart, and women will choose to terminate their pregnan-
cies without thereby choosing the inevitable death of the fetuses 
they are carrying. "1 
"Women understand that abortion terminates pregnancy and 
that some form of life-for some a human life with full human at-
tributes, for others, something more inchoate-is extinguished by 
virtue of the procedure; that is its very point. ,.e 
"'[T]he abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the 
growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead 
r. t 11!3 
1e us. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States describes a woman's 
constitutional right to an elective abortion as a right to terminate 
her pregnancy prior to viability.4 That description begs a question 
that may someday be as important in practice as it is in principle: 
whether the right to an elective abortion includes the right to 
"terminate"-that is, kill or otherwise ensure the death of-the 
pre-viable fetus. 5 In today's world, the conduct that would square-
ly present this question-killing a pre-viable fetus although it 
could have survived an abortion and become a child-cannot oc-
cur in practice. The right to elective abortion applies only to fe-
tuses that are not viable, which means, by definition, that they 
have been determined to have no realistic chance of surviving 
outside the uterus, even with the help of neonatal intensive care.6 
Today's abortion methods almost invariably involve the violent 
killing of the fetus. 7 But even if abortion providers used fetus-
(plurality opinion) (quoting, seemingly with distaste, the testimony of abortion provider 
Dr. Robert Crist). 
4. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality opin· 
ion) ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central 
principle of Roe v. Wade."); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (holding general-
ly that a woman may terminate her pregnancy before viability). 
5. Unless otherwise indicated, I will use the term "fetus" to refer to the human or· 
ganism at every stage of development from conception to birth. Accord Donald Regan, Re-
writing Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (1979) (employing this usage). 
6. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (viability requires "a realistic possibility" of survival 
outside the womb); Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (a fetus is viable if it is "potentially able to live 
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid"). 
7. During the first trimester, when about 90% of abortions are performed, the stand-
ard method is "vacuum aspiration," in which a vacuum tube is inserted into the uterus 
and the fetus, placenta, and amniotic sac are evacuated. Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 923 
(2000). The overwhelming majority of second-trimester abortions are done by "dilation and 
evacuation" ("D&E"), in which the abortion doctor uses instruments to pull the fetus out of 
the ute;us. Id: at 924. After the fifteenth week, the fetus is typically too large to be re-
moved mtact; m that event, the instruments are used to dismember it and the pieces are 
pulled through the cervix. Id. at 925. Occasionally, abortion doctors use the partial-birth 
ab~rtion tech~ique, which is a subset of what they prefer to call "intact D&E." Id. at 927. 
'fh1s method mvolves removing the fetus intact from the uterus, in breech position, until 
the head lodges in the cervix. The doctor then pierces the skull with a scissors, and vacu-
ums out the brain, after which the collapsed skull can be pulled through the cervix. Id. 
The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003, upheld against constitutional challenges 
m Carhart II, makes it illegal to perform a partial-birth abortion on a living fetus. See 
Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 124, 164 (2007). But even when Carhart I was decided in 2000, it 
was common practice to administer a lethal injection to the fetus after the twentieth week 
"~o facilitate ~vacuation," see 530 U.S. at 925, and nowadays the standard late-term abor-
t10n protocol mcludes a pre-abortion lethal fetal injection. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 924-
25; David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future o/ Abortion 
Law, 2007 S. CT. REV. 1, 31 (2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). Finally, in a small 
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sparing methods rather than fetus-killing ones, aborted fetuses 
would die within minutes after being removed from their moth-
ers' wombs.8 Consequently, whether or not the woman's right to 
terminate her pregnancy includes a legal entitlement to kill the 
pre-viable fetus, elective abortion inevitably results in fetal death 
in practice. For that very reason, the woman has no choice in the 
matter: should she elect to terminate her pregnancy, the fetus 
will die even if she wants it to survive.9 
Yet it would be a mistake to infer that this question is merely 
academic. Even if the legal consequences were identical, there is 
a momentous moral difference between a right to elective abor-
tion that is limited to removing or expelling an unwanted fetus 
prior to viability, and a right that also entitles the woman affirm-
atively to kill it under at least some circumstances. Beyond that, 
already today, and even more as reproductive technologies ad-
vance, these opposing visions of the right to elective abortion have 
dramatically different legal implications. 
Consider first two technological breakthroughs that may occur 
in the not-so-distant future: (1) improved surgical techniques that 
enable fetuses to be removed from their mothers' wombs intact 
and alive at any stage of gestation; and (2) artificial wombs in 
which these fetuses can be gestated to term. 10 Imagine further 
minority of second-trimester cases the abortion doctor induces labor prematurely. Carhart 
I, 530 U.S. at 924. Whether this method kills the fetus before delivery depends on how la-
bor is induced. In the 1970s, when inducing labor was the most common second-trimester 
abortion method, the standard protocol was to inject saline solution into the amniotic sac. 
Id. This "instillation" method typically resulted in fetal death in utero from chemical 
burns or saline poisoning. 
8. I will use the term "fetus-sparing abortion" to refer to a procedure (including in-
duction of labor) in which the physician attempts prematurely to terminate a pregnancy 
by removing the fetus from the woman's body intact and alive, and the term "fetus-killing 
abortion" to refer to a procedure one of whose objectives is to kill the fetus either before or 
during its removal from the woman's body. 
9. The Court may have overlooked this fact when it stated in Harris v. McRae that 
"[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other proce-
dure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life." 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980). The 
death of the fetus is very often-but not always-among the woman's purposes. In some 
cases, the woman chooses abortion knowing the fetus will die as a result, but would spare 
it if she could do so without carrying the pregnancy to term. 
10. Researchers have reported some progress in recent years, and some observers 
have predicted that artificial wombs will be developed within the next few decades. Jere-
my Rifkin, 'The End of Pregnancy: Within a Generation There Will Be [sic] Probably Be 
Mass Use of Artificial Wombs to Grow Babies, GUAHDIAN (Jan. 16, 2002), available at 
www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/17/gender.medicalscience. Others continue to be-
lieve, as the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law asserted in its 1988 report on 
Fetal Extrauterine Survivability, that "no technology exists to bridge the development gap 
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that the costs of these dual artificial-womb technol~gies-which I 
will refer to as "AW"-while much higher than th~se of a fetus-
killing abortion, are low enough to enable the widespread use of 
AW; 11 that AW gives fetuses at all stages of gestation a realistic 
chance of survival to full term and beyond; and that the fetus-
sparing abortion methods used in tandem with AW are very safe 
for women (even if not as safe as fetus-killing abortions). Under 
those circumstances, AW would be a feasible, effective, and safe 
alternative to today's fetus-killing abortion methods-and would 
mean that pre-viable fetuses are rescuable via AW. 12 If they are 
aborted using fetus-killing methods such as those now in use, 
they will die. If instead they are subjected to fetus-sparing abor-
tions, many of them will survive and be transferred to artificial 
wombs for gestation to full term. 
between the three-day embryo culture and the 24th week of gestation" and that complete 
extrauterine development is not a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. NEW YOHK 
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW FETAL EXTRAUTEHINE SURVIVA13ILITY 3 (1988) 
(quoted in Webster v. Reprod. Health Ser~s., 492 U.S. 490, 554 n.9 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part)). In short, it remains unclear whether or when artificial wombs will 
become practicable. For a useful discussion of the research that has been done on artificial 
wombs, see Jessica H. Schultz, Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Af-
fect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 877, 878-83 (2010). 
11. It seems axiomatic that a procedure that must comply with the additional re-
quirement that the fetus be removed alive and intact will, on average, be more difficult 
and hence more expensive than a procedure in which efficacy and maternal safety are the 
only objectives. And then there are the costs of gestating a fetus for up to nine months in 
an artificial womb. Precisely because an artificial womb would more successfully imitate 
natu.re than contemporary neonatal care can, one might predict that its costs would be ap-
preciably smaller than the roughly $200,000 average cost of caring for an extremely prem-
ature newborn in the United States. See William M. Gilbert, Thomas S. Nesbitt, & Beate 
Danielsen, The Cost of Prematurity: Quantification by Gestational Age and Birth Weight, 
10~ ~~STETHICS & GYNECOLOGY 488, 490 (2003). Nevertheless, between the costs of the 
artificrnl wombs themselves and the monitoring that they would presumably require, one 
would expect the average cost of gestation in an artificial womb to be quite high. See gen-
erally General & Human Biology Bioethics Case Studies: Artificial Wombs, MCGRAW HILL, 
h~t?://www.mhhe.com/biosci/genbio/olc_linkedcontents/bioethics_cases/g-bioe-17.htm (last 
v1s.1ted Apr. ~· 2015) ("If artificial wombs for humans become a reality, they are likely to be 
quite expensive.") . 
. 12 .. For more than th~rty years, commentators have pointed out that artificial wombs 
will raise the legal quest10n whether the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy in-
cludes a right to ensure the death of the fetus. See, e.g., Robert J. Favole, Note, Artificial 
Gestation: New Meaning for the Right to Terminate Pregnancy, 21 Amz. L. REV. 755 
(1979); Mark A. Goldstein, Note, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right 
and State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 
877. (1978). Others have focused on the parallel moral question that will arise once AW is 
available. See, e.g., CHHISTOPHER KACZOR, THE EDGE OF LIFE: HUMAN DIGNI'l'Y AND 
CO~TEMPORARY BIOETHICS 107 (2005) (discussing whether, if artificial wombs become 
available, defenders of a moral right to abortion will accept that it is limited to "evacuation 
abortion," or insist that it includes "terminative abortion"). 
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If every fetus that can survive outside its biological mother's 
womb is ipso facto viable, these new technologies would mean 
that states could ban elective abortion even early in pregnancy. 
As I argue elsewhere, however, under Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, fetal viability 
includes an implicit developmental requirement: although the 
Court has never specified what that requirement is, this article 
will assume that the fetus must have developed sufficiently that 
it can survive outside any womb, even if it initially requires some 
less comprehensive type of artificial aid. 13 Consequently, the right 
to elective abortion will continue to apply to fetuses that are not 
yet developmentally viable-even though these fetuses can be 
rescued via AW. 
Suppose that a state sought to protect these rescuable fetuses 
by enacting legislation prohibiting fetus-killing abortion methods, 
and providing AW at the state's expense to any woman who chose 
to terminate her pregnancy. 14 If the right to elective abortion in-
cludes a specific right to ensure the death of the pre-viable fetus, 
such a "fetal-rescue program" would plainly be unconstitutional. 
Conversely, a fetal-rescue program would unquestionably be con-
stitutional if the right to elective abortion affords no protection to 
the woman's liberty interest in ensuring the death of her fetus. 15 
If, as this article argues, the answer lies in between these ex-
tremes, the outcome should turn on whether the woman's pro-
tected liberty interest outweighs the state's interest in rescuing 
the fetus via AW. 
13. See Stephen G. Gilles, Two Concepts of Viability (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
14. See Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling 
Viability's Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 219 (2005) (describing "em-
bryonic extraction legislation" requiring that fetuses be transferred to AW rather than 
subjected to traditional abortion methods); Dr. Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, Compro-
mising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the Abor-
tion Controversy, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 24 (2005) (proposing a legal regime that allows 
"eviction" (i.e., a fetus-sparing abortion) but prohibits fetus-killing abortions). Son does not 
discuss who bears the pecuniary costs of "embryonic extraction." Block and Whitehead as-
sert that the woman should not have to pay the additional costs of "eviction," but envision 
that these costs would be defrayed by pro-life groups rather than by the state. See id. at 
33. 
15. A state law prohibiting fetus-killing abortions, and requiring the woman to pay 
the presumably high costs of AW, would fail the undue burden standard even if the right 
to elective abortion protects only the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, because it 
would make abortions unaffordable for most women. 
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Consider next an issue that is already with us: to what extent 
states may regulate the treatment and disposition of cryo-
preserved embryos created in connection with in vitro fertiliza-
tion: Many women decide not to gestate some of their cryo-
preserved embryos, and arrange for their destruction or indefinite 
cryopreservation.16 Under Roe and Casey, however, the state has 
an important interest in protecting all "postconception" fetal life, 17 
and a strong argument can be made that conception is complete 
by the time cryopreserved embryos are frozen. 18 If so-and if the 
right to elective abortion is limited to terminating an unwanted 
pregnancy-states could presumably prohibit the destruction or 
indefinite cryopreservation of embryos, and require that unused 
embryos be transferred to state custody so that gestational moth-
ers could be found for them. On the other hand, these require-
ments would presumably be unconstitutional if a woman's right 
to elective abortion includes a specific right to ensure the death of 
her pre-viable fetus. Here too, this article argues for the interme-
diate position that the woman's interest in ensuring the death of 
her cryopreserved embryos must be weighed against the state's 
interest in protecting them. 
Parts I-III of this article use a hypothetical AW fetal-rescue 
program to explore whether (and if so, to what extent) the right to 
elective abortion protects the woman's liberty interest in ensuring 
the death of her pre-viable fetus. 19 Although the article argues 
that fetal-rescue programs are constitutional under Casey, the 
16.. See Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and De-
struction of Frozen Human Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the 
La~k of Law in the United States, 76 WASH. L. REV. 759, 759-60 (1998) (detailing couples' 
opt10ns when their fertility clinics have leftover embryos including arranging for their 
destruction or keeping them frozen). ' 
. l '!. See Pl~n.ned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority 
opm10n) (descnbmg Roe's "scope" as encompassing "postconception potential life"). 
18. '1'.he ~xact moment when "conception" is complete is a disputed question on which 
the c?nst1tut~onal status ?f cryopreserved embryos will likely turn. See Philip G. Peters, 
Jr., 11ie Amb~guou_s Meaning of Human Conception, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199-200 (2006). 
~art IV of this article argues that conception is complete by the two-cell stage of embryon-
ic deve~opment: Consequently, cryopreserved embryos-which are typically frozen at the 
four-, six-, or eight-cell stage-qualify as "postconception" life for constitutional purposes. 
See Lyme M. Thomas, Abandoned Frozen Embryos and Texas Law of Abandoned Personal 
Property: Should There Be a Connection?, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255, 286 (1997). 
1 
:9. I~ ?-dd~tion to th~ so~irces cited_in note 14 supra, recent treatments of the potential 
egal ram1f1cat10ns of art1fic1~l wombs mclude Schultz, supra note 10; Eric Steiger, Not of 
Woman Born: How Ectogenesis Will Change the Way We View Viability Birth and the Sta-
t~s ?f the Un?~rn,. 23 J. L. & HEALTH 143, 144 (2010); and Amel Algrhani, i'he Legal and 
Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEAL'l'H L & POL'Y 189 
(2007). ' . 
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basis for that conclusion is not a categorical rule that the woman 
has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in ensuring the 
death of the pre-viable fetus. On the contrary, Part I argues that, 
under Casey, her liberty interest is "specially protected," meaning 
that state-imposed burdens on that interest are subject to more 
than rational basis scrutiny. 
Part II then argues that the appropriate form of heightened 
scrutiny is the interest-balancing methodology employed in Casey 
to reestablish the right to elective abortion, rather than Roe's 
strict scrutiny or the "undue burden" test Casey adopts for state 
laws that interfere with a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. 
Consequently, the constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs 
turns on whether the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable 
fetus outweighs the woman's protected liberty interest in ensur-
ing its death. 
Part III addresses this question. After describing and evaluat-
ing the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus and 
the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life, analyzing 
and applying Casey's implications for the relative strength of 
those interests, and presenting arguments bearing on which in-
terest is stronger as a matter of "reasoned judgment,"20 it arrives 
at this conclusion: the right to elective abortion does not include a 
right to ensure the death of the pre-viable fetus if the fetus is res-
cuable via state-provided AW, so that rescuing it would directly 
advance the state's interest in protecting its life. In other words, 
the state's interest in rescuing the pre-viable fetus via AW out-
weighs the woman's interest in ensuring that it does not survive 
the termination of her pregnancy.21 
20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (asserting that the Court must rely on "reasoned judg-
ment" to define the scope of the liberty protected by substantive due process). 
21. Many writers have suggested that the Equal Protection Clause rather than the 
Due Process Clause is the proper constitutional source of abortion rights. See Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. 
L. REV. 375, 382-86 (1985); Sylvia Law, Rethinhing Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955, 1036-37 (1984); Heva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective 
on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 351-53 
(1992). Carhart II, Justice Ginsburg's dissent seemed to endorse this approach, although 
without expressly invoking the Equal Protection Clause. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 172 
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion pro-
cedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on 
a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship 
stature."). This article does not attempt to evaluate the arguments for recasting abortion 
rights in equal protection terms. For a critical treatment of them, see Erika Bachiochi, 
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In light of this conclusion, Part IV turns to state regulation of 
cryopreserved embryos. It argues that cryopreserved embryos 
created using current practices, which typically contain four, six, 
or eight cells,22 are "postconception potential life,"23 and as such 
are within the ambit of the state's interest in protecting (and en-
abling the development of) pre-viable fetal life. Moreover, the 
woman's interest in destroying her cryopreserved embryos (or in 
preventing their development by keeping them frozen indefinite-
ly) is no stronger, and on average is likely weaker, than her inter-
est in ensuring the death of a pre-viable fetus. Accordingly, state 
legislation prohibiting the destruction of cryopreserved embryos 
and requiring that they be gestated within a reasonable time, or 
else transferred to the state for adoptive gestation, is constitu-
tional under Casey. 
I. UNDER ROE AND CASEY, THE WOMAN'S LIBERTY INTEREST IN 
ENSURING THE DEATH OF HER FETUS Is SPECIALLY PROTECTED BY 
SOME 'rYPE OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
Unlike Roe,21 Casey does not classify the woman's liberty inter-
est in an elective abortion as "fundamental," and therefore trig-
gering strict scrutiny. 25 Nevertheless, Casey unquestionably 
treats that liberty interest as "specially 'protected' by the Consti-
tution"26-that is, triggering a form of heightened scrutiny. 27 Ca-
sey reaffirms the right to elective abortion, which it treats as 
grounded in an interest-balancing judgment that the woman's 
overall liberty interest in an elective abortion outweighs the 
state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus. 28 Under Casey, 
Embodied Equality: Debunhing Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 889, 891, 949-50 (2011). Neither does this article attempt to work 
through the effects such a transformation would have on whether a woman is entitled to 
ensure the death of her pre· viable fetus when the state is prepared to rescue it via AW. 
22. Peters, supra note 18, at 217 ("[R]obust but unused embroyos are commonly frozen 
at the four-, six-, or eight-cell state so that they can be used in the future."). 
23. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859. 
24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122 (1973). 
. 25. , See Casey, 50.5 U.S. at 8~6 (majority opinion), 869-71 (plurality opinion) (reaffirm· 
mg Roes central holdmg but optmg for interest-balancing approach). 
26. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
" 27. See G_a~ey, 505 l'..8. at 851 (majority opinion) (arguing that abortion is among the 
p~rsonal .dec1s1ons relatmg to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearmg, and education," and that these decisions receive heightened "constitutional 
protection" because they are "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [and] 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
28. See id. at 857 (majority opinion). Interest balancing is appropriately characterized 
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it is interest balancing at a high level of generality-not strict 
scrutiny, and not rational basis scrutiny-that justifies the pri-
mary protection of the woman's liberty interest: the rule that 
state prohibitions on pre-viability elective abortions are unconsti-
tutional. z!l 
In addition, however, Casey adopts the undue burden standard 
to evaluate laws that regulate (but do not prohibit) elective abor-
tions.:io An abortion law is unconstitutional if it has the purpose or 
effect of creating a substantial obstacle to women's access to elec-
tive abortions.31 Although the undue burden test rests on an in-
terest-balancing judgment, it does not work by balancing inter-
ests: all regulations that have "the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus" are unconstitutional.32 Consequently, if the 
woman's liberty to ensure the death of her fetus is among the in-
terests protected by the right to an elective abortion, it will be 
necessary to determine which approach-interest balancing or 
the undue burden standard-applies to laws (such as fetal-rescue 
programs) that interfere with that interest. Part II will take up 
that question. The prior question, which this part addresses, is 
whether the woman's liberty interest in the death of her fetus is 
specially protected under Casey. 
as a form of heightened scrutiny both because the Court has employed it for individual 
interests the Court plainly regards as particularly weighty, and because it places a heavi-
er burden of justification on the state than rational basis review. Under the latter, the 
state need only show that its interest is legitimate, not that its interest outweighs the 
competing individual interest. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 
54 UCLA L. RE;v. 1267, 1298-99 (2007) (discussing the Court's employment of interest 
balancing, including in abortion cases). 
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 858 (majority opinion); see also Fallon, supra note 28, at 1299 
(discussing the intermediate scrutiny applied in Casey). 
30. Id. at 876, 881 (plurality opinion). 
31. Id. at 876-77. 
32. Id. at 877 (explaining that no law imposing an undue burden "could be constitu-
tional"). This is not to deny that balancing may play some role in undue burden analysis. 
In particular, a court's judgment about what counts as a "substantial obstacle" may reflect 
a comparison of the burden on women with the extent to which the state regulation in fact 
advances the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetuses. See Khiara M. Bridges, "Life" 
in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 
1317-18 (2013). The federal courts of appeals are currently divided on this issue. Com-
pare, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Lahey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir.) vacated in part, 
135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (in applying the undue-burden test "we do not balance the wisdom or 
effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law imposes"), with Planned Parenthood 
Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 912-13 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014) 
("The more substantial the burden, the stronger the state's justification for the law must 
be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger the state's justification, the 
greater the burden may be before it becomes "undue."'). 
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Before turning to this question, it is useful to take a closer look 
at the nature of this interest. Some women may choose abortion 
solely to avoid the considerable physical and emotional burdens of 
pregnancy and childbirth.3'1 More often, however, ·the phrase "un-
wanted pregnancy" is a euphemism for "unwanted child"-that is, 
a child the woman is unwilling (or unable) to nurture and raise 
after it is born.31 Legally speaking, every state allows the woman 
to escape child-rearing by renouncing her parental rights, in 
which event the child will be cared for by adoptive or foster par-
ents.35 Yet experience shows that many women find it exceedingly 
difficult to relinquish their newborn children, even when those 
children were (and perhaps still are) unwanted. 36 When Roe was 
decided, only 20% of single mothers put their children up for 
adoption-and that percentage has declined since then.
37 
As Pro-
fessor Reva Siegel points out, 
A woman is likely to form emotional bonds with a child during preg-
nancy; she is likely to believe that she has moral obligations to a 
born child that are far greater than any she might have to an em-
bryo/fetus; and she is likely to experience intense familial and social 
pressure to raise a child she has borne. 38 
When women do relinquish their infants, they frequently grieve 
for years over their separation from them. 39 
33. See Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortion: Quantitative 
and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPIWDUCTIVE HEALTH 110, 113 
~able 2 (2005), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.pdf (indicat-
mg that some women choose abortions for reasons such as, "[I] don't want people to know I 
had sex or got pregnant" and "Physical problems with my health"). 
34. Id. (showing that reasons such as "Having a baby would dramatically change my 
l'f" d "C ' ' 1 e ~n ant afford a baby right now," are significant factors in many decisions to have 
abort10ns). 
35. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Ls 
It an. Of.lion for Lesbian .and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 389 
(1996) ( Every state provides some irrevocable mechanism for both biological parents to 
relinquish their legal status."). 
36. ~ee CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, IMPACT OF ADOPTION 
ON Bmnr PARENTS 2-3 (2013), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/f_im 
pact.pdf . 
. 3?. Jack. Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions: Advocating a Quantitative 
L:mit on Private Agency Adoption Fees, 8 SEATTLE J. Soc. ,JUSTICE 729, 732 (2010) ("In 
1973, twenty percent of unwed mothers placed their children up for adoption; by 1982, this 
rate dropped to twelve percent."). Evon if, as seems likely, a significant subset of unwed 
mothers may have wanted to become pregnant, the generalization in text would still be 
warranted. 
38. Siegel, supra note 21 at 372. 
39. See CHILD WELFAHE INI<'O. GATEWAY, supra note 36, at 2-3. 
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~t seems fair to infer that many women view the emotional, 
reputational, and relational burdens involved in relinquishing an 
unwanted child as even greater than the expected burdens of 
raising it. 40 What is more, the available data concerning the rea-
sons why women have abortions suggest that avoiding the post-
natal burdens of raising or relinquishing an unwanted child is de-
cisive far more often than avoiding pregnancy and childbirth. 41 
Only a small minority of women list avoiding pregnancy and 
childbirth among their reasons for electing abortion, 42 while the 
most frequently cited reasons are disruption of life plans, econom-
ic difficulties, and problematic relations with the father. 4a 
Thus, the woman who is pregnant with an unwanted child 
finds herself in this situation: the very fact that she does not 
want the child makes the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth 
harder to bear, and once she gives birth she must accept either 
the burdens of raising her newborn child, or those of relinquish-
ing it. 14 An elective abortion will enable her to avoid pregnancy 
and childbirth (by terminating her pregnancy), and to avoid the 
raise-or-relinquish dilemma (by ensuring that her pre-viable fe-
tus does not survive). Consequently, a law that prohibits elective 
abortions will frustrate both of these interests. 
By contrast, a fetal-rescue program burdens only the latter in-
terest, and burdens it in a different way. It puts the woman in 
what we might call the gestate-or-relinquish dilemma: carry the 
fetus to term or relinquish it to the state prior to viability for at-
tempted rescue via AW. The gestate-or-relinquish dilemma can 
best be characterized as a pre-viability, prenatal version of the 
40. A variety of factors may explain why this is so. For example, a woman might dis-
count the costs of child-rearing because they are spread out over the child's adolescence; 
might anticipate that she will adapt to the burdens of childrearing because she will come 
to love the child; or might anticipate that she will experience lasting sorrow because her 
child will be raised by others. 
41. See Finer et al., supra note 33 at 113, tbl.2. 
42. The Alan Guttmacher Institute's surveys on the reasons women have abortions, as 
contained in the research journal Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, do not 
even list "avoiding the physical discomforts of pregnancy and childbirth" as a reason. 
About 12% of women listed "physical problem with my health" as one of their reasons for 
having an abortion, and it seems likely that some of those women were generally healthy 
but concerned about the physical burdens of pregnancy. See id. 
43. See id. According to the survey, "Having a baby would dramatically change my 
life" was the most frequently cited reason for electing abortion (74%). The reasons, "Can't 
afford a baby now," and "Don't want to be a single mother or having relationship prob-
lems," were the next most common (48%). Id. 
44. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1582. 
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raise-or-relinquish dilemma. Like its postnatal analogue, it frus-
trates the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus. If 
she opts not to carry the fetus to term, she must reli_nquish ~t to 
the state, and if AW succeeds, her biological child will be raised 
-by others. · 
As Part III explains, the burden of relinquishing one's pre-
viable fetus is likely to be considerably less weighty than the bur-
den of relinquishing one's newborn child. Nevertheless, in both 
cases the woman's basic interest is the same-ensuring that her 
fetus does not survive to become a child she will have relin-
quished. Consequently, if the woman has a specially protected 
liberty interest in avoiding the raise-or-relinquish dilemma, we 
can be confident that she also has a specially protected liberty in-
terest in avoiding the gestate-or-relinquish dilemma triggered by 
fetal-rescue programs. 
If Roe and Casey focused exclusively on the woman's interest in 
avoiding the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, one could infer 
that her specially protected liberty interest in an elective abortion 
does not include ensuring the death of the fetus. Instead, howev-
er, Roe treats the burdens of child-raising (and by implication, 
those of child-relinquishing) as an important part of the case for 
recognizing that the woman's liberty to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy is encompassed by the "right of privacy."
15 
An unwant-
ed pregnancy, the Court said, "may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future," in which her "health may be taxed by 
child care"; she may experience "the distress ... associated with 
the unwanted child"; she may have to wrestle with "the problem 
of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it"; and she may also experience "the 
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed mother-
hood."w And while Casey's account of the woman's liberty begins 
by emphasizing the "anxieties," "physical constraints," and "pain" 
of pregnancy and childbirth, it culminates with the claim that 
"[h]er suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to in-
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Although the Court made no specific men-
tion of the raise-or-relinquish dilemma, its allusion to "the distress" associated with the 
unwanted child may be a veiled reference to it. See id. In any event, Roe's description of 
the burdens of giving birth to an unwanted child, which assumes that raising the child is 
the norm, leaves no doubt that the Court did not view adoption as an "easy way out" for 
pregnant women. See id. 
46. Id. 
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sist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, how-
ever dominant that vision has been in the course of our history 
·and our culture." 17 The "vision of the woman's role" to which the 
Court refers 18 is obviously her role as mother-and in our history 
and culture that includes child-rearing as well as child-bearing. 
Similarly, if Casey had relied solely on a bodily autonomy ra-
tionale for the woman's liberty interest in elective abortion, 19 we 
could infer that ensuring the death of the fetus is not protected. 
Bodily autonomy cannot ground a right to destroy the fetus be-
cause it is not part of the woman's body, and because removing 
the fetus from her body will restore the woman to her pre-
pregnant condition whether or not the fetus survives.50 The Casey 
Court, however, also endorsed a reproductive liberty rationale, 
arguing that Roe stands in the line of cases specially protecting 
the liberty to decide "whether or not to beget or bear a child,"51 
and asserting that "in some critical respects the abortion decision 
is of the same character as the decision to use contraception."52 
Lest one think the common ground between abortion and contra-
ception is solely that both enable a woman to avoid pregnancy 
and childbirth, Casey highlights the plight of a woman who be-
lieves that "the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the 
infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent."53 
Although Casey does not spell out how the right to an elective 
abortion enables this woman to avoid bringing a child she is una-
ble to care for into the world, there can be only one answer: by 
ensuring that her fetus does not survive the abortion. Casey's 
reasoning thus implies that the woman's liberty interest in not 
47. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (majority opin-
ion). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 857 (stating that Roe may be seen as grounded in "personal autonomy 
and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental 
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection"). 
50. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: 'The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 
VA. L. REV. 437, 486-87 (1990) (arguing that the woman's right to elective abortion, un-
derstood as "a right of bodily integrity or freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions or bur-
dens," is a right "to terminate the pregnancy ... not a right to destroy the embryo/fetus if 
her bodily integrity may otherwise be protected"). 
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (majority opinion). 
52. Id. at 852; see also id. at 884 (plurality opinion) (referring to "the two more general 
rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and 
the right to physical autonomy"). 
53. Id. at 853 (majority opinion). 
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reproducing is protected by the right to elective abortion as well 
as by the right to use contraception.51 
·II. UNDER CASEY, THE WOMAN'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THE 
DEATH OF THE FETUS SHOULD TRIGGER AN INTEREST-BALANCING 
ANALYSIS, NOT STRICT SCRU'l'INY OR THE UNDUE BURDEN 
STANDARD 
That the woman's liberty interest in ensuring the death of her 
fetus is protected by the right to elective abortion does not mean 
that she has a specific right to insist on the death of her pre-
viable fetus and hence that fetal-rescue programs are unconstitu-
tional.55 This part argues that, under Casey, whether such a right 
exists should be determined by balancing the woman's interest in 
ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus against the state's in-
terest in protecting its life, and not by application of the undue 
burden standard. 
Interest balancing underlies the right to elective abortion as 
redefined in Casey. 56 In place of Roe's holding that there is a fun-
damental right to elective abortion until viability,57 Casey holds 
that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests are not strong enough 
to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a sub-
stantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the proce-
dure."58 Casey thereby grounds the right to elective abortion in a 
54. Id. at 852; see id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55. Were Roe's strict scrutiny controlling, fetal-rescue programs would plainly be un-
constitutional: they interfere with the woman's fundamental right to terminate her preg-
nancy as she and her doctor think best (using a fetus-killing method), thereby frustrating 
one of the woman's protected interests (ensuring the death of the fetus)-and they do so to 
advance what Roe held to be the state's less-than-compelling, and therefore inadequate, 
interest in pre-viable fetuses. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162, 163 (1973). 
56. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73 (plurality opinion). 
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973) (noting that the woman's liberty to 
choose an abortion constitutes a "fundamental rightD" that may be infringed only by laws 
that are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest). 
?8: Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion); see id. at 869-71 (plurality opinion) (ex-
plammg that, after viability, "the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the 
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted"); see also id. at 954 
(Relmquist, C .• J., dissenting) (noting that the joint opinion rejects the view that there is a 
fundamental right to elective abortion that can be overcome only by a compelling state in-
terest); Richard H. Fallon, ,Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1299 
(~007) ("Whereas Roe v. Wade held that infringements on the fundamental right to abor-
tion could be upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, 
Pla_nned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey substituted a formula under 
which courts now assess whether abortion regulations place an 'undue burden' on a worn· 
an's right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.") (citations omitted). 
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new analytical foundation: a direct interest-balancing judgment 
that the woman's overall interest in having an abortion out-
weighs the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life. 59 This 
interest-balancing judgment does not tell us whether the woman's 
interest in ensuring the death of the fetus, standing alone, out-
weighs the state's interest in protecting fetal life.60 Under Casey, 
this is a question of first impression that should be decided by the 
same sort of direct interest balancing the plurality opinion relied 
on in reaffirming Roe's central holding.61 
In addition to interest balancing, however, Casey also adopted 
the undue burden standard to evaluate regulations that, while 
not prohibiting elective abortions, interfere with women's access 
to them to some extent.62 Because fetal-rescue programs seem to 
fit that description, it could be argued that their constitutionality 
should be determined by applying the undue burden standard ra-
ther than by interest balancing. This issue is especially im-
portant, because there is a good chance that fetal-rescue pro-
grams would fail the undue burden standard.63 
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also id. at 861 (describing viability as "the point at 
which the balance of interests tips"). 
60. A parallel question would be presented by a state law that burdened the woman's 
interest in avoiding pregnancy and childbirth, but not her interest in ensuring the death of 
the fetus. But any state law that satisfied this description would fail to advance the state's 
interest in protecting fetal life, and consequently would be unconstitutional under an in-
terest-balancing approach. 
61. See, e.g., id. at 871 (plurality opinion); see Cruzan v Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 279 (1990) ("Determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process 
Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been 
violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state 
interests."') (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)). 
62. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue bur-
den on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the 
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."). 
63. A regulation imposes an undue burden if its "purpose or effect" is to create a sub-
stantial obstacle to women seeking elective abortions. Id. at 877. The state's willingness to 
pay the heavy costs of AW gives rise to a compelling inference that the "purpose" of fetal-
rescue programs is to save aborted fetuses, not to prevent women from obtaining abor-
tions. Nevertheless, fetal-rescue programs might run afoul of the undue burden test's "ef-
fects" prong. The inquiry would focus on women who would much rather have a now-
forbidden fetus-killing abortion than a fetus-sparing abortion followed by attempted res-
cue of their fetus via an artificial womb. See id. at 894 (majority opinion) ("The proper fo-
cus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group 
for whom the law is irrelevant."). While some of these women would reluctantly opt for 
fetus-sparing abortions, others would seek out illegal fetus-killing abortions (or travel to 
states where they are legal), and a third group would be deterred from terminating their 
pregnancies tout court. Depending in part on how widespread these effects were thought to 
be, they might either be deemed "incidental" or seen as imposing an undue burden on 
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Once we consider the intended function of the undue burden 
standard, however, the case for using it collapses. The :indue 
burden test strikes a balance between the woman~s overall liberty 
interest in an elective abortion and the state's interest in protect-
ing fetal life by regulating (but not prohibiting) abortions.
61 
As 
Casey explains, the undue burden test's domain consists of abor-
tion regulations that "mak[e] it more difficult or more expensive 
to procure an abortion,"65 thereby burdening both the woman's in-
terest in avoiding pregnancy and childbirth and her interest in 
ensuring the death of the fetus. Regulations such as those at is-
sue in Casey, which impose requirements that must be met before 
a woman can terminate her pregnancy, fall squarely within this 
description. 6G So would a statute that burdened the woman's lib-
erty to terminate her pregnancy by requiring her to pay the high 
costs of AW. Fetal-rescue programs, by contrast, do not make it 
more difficult or more expensive for the woman to terminate her 
pregnancy. They burden only her interest in ensuring that her fe-
tus does not survive the termination of her pregnancy, and conse-
quently should not be subject to the undue burden test. 
This analysis is confirmed by the anomalous results that might 
ensue if the Court evaluated fetal-rescue programs using the un-
due burden standard rather than by balancing the woman's in-
terest in ensuring the death of the fetus against the state's inter-
est in protecting its life. Were the Court to conclude that fetal-
rescue programs impose an undue burden on women's access to 
elective abortions, it would be creating a new right to ensure the 
death of rescuable fetuses without ever having balanced the in-
terests that Casey's own methodology indicates should determine 
whether such a right exists. 67 This cannot be right. Only by exam-
ining whether the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fe-
wome~'s access to elective abortions. See id. at 874 (plurality opinion). Although the out-
come is necessarily speculative in the absence of experience with AW technologies, there is 
clearly a realistic possibility that fetal-rescue programs would fail the undue burden test. 
. 64. See id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconcil-
mg the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty."); see also 
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2000) ("Casey, in short, struck a balance. The balance was 
central to its holding.") 
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion). 
6~. See id. at 895 (majority opinion) (holding that Pennsylvania's spousal notification 
reqmrement posed an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, as it "[would] oper-
ate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion" and was there-
fore invalid). ' 
67. See id. at 871 (plurality opinion) (discussing the Court's interest-balancing meth-
odology). 
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tus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring its death can we 
determine whether fetal-rescue programs are constitutional un-
der Casey. 
III. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN RESCUING THE PRE-VIABLE FETUS 
OUTWEIGHS THE WOMAN'S INTEREST IN ENSURING ITS DEA'l'H 
The argument so far can be summarized as follows: under Ca-
sey, the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the fetus is 
within the liberty specially protected by the right to elective abor-
tion; accordingly, fetal-rescue programs should be evaluated us-
ing the interest-balancing approach Casey itself used in reaffirm-
ing Roe's central holding. In conducting this analysis, I will 
assume that the woman's overall interest in an elective abortion 
outweighs the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus-
and thus that the right to elective abortion is, on Casey's premis-
es, sound on the merits as well as supported by stare decisis. 68 On 
that assumption, this part (1) provides thorough descriptions-
and assessments-of the woman's interest in ensuring the death 
of the fetus and the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal 
life; (2) analyzes and applies Casey's implications for the relative 
68. In a companion article, I present a different (but related) interest-balancing ar-
gument that, if correct, would establish the constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs. 
Stephen G. Gilles, Why the Right to Elective Abortion Fails Casey's Own Interest· 
Balancing Methodology-and Why It Matters, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. _ (forthcoming). 
The thrust of that argument is that, setting aside stare decisis, the right to elective abor· 
tion fails the interest-balancing analysis that, under Casey, would be necessary to justify 
that right as an original matter. See id. at_, _. The judgments of a majority of the Jus· 
tices in Casey, a careful comparison of the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life with the 
woman's interest in an elective abortion, and the traditional protections Anglo-American 
law accorded to fetuses, all support the judgment that the state's interest outweighs the 
woman's even in the earliest stages of pregnancy. Consequently, even if (as Casey holds) 
the right to elective abortion should be preserved by virtue of stare decisis, 505 U.S. at 
860-61, legislation such as fetal-rescue programs should be evaluated on the understand-
ing that the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's in-
terest in an elective abortion. If the argument is correct, the constitutionality of fetal-
rescue programs follows a fortiori. Given that the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus 
outweighs the woman's overall interest in an elective abortion, which includes both avoid-
ing pregnancy and ensuring the death of the fetus, it must also outweigh the interest with 
which a fetal-rescue program interferes-her stand-alone interest in ensuring the death of 
the fetus. 
Although I continue to think that the argument just summarized is cogent, there is no 
need to repeat it in full here. For even if that argument is wrong, the interest-balancing 
analysis this article presents suffices to show that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal 
life outweighs the woman's interest in the death of the fetus. (Some duplication, however, 
is unavoidable: in particular, Parts III.B-III.D of this article draw heavily on the com pan· 
ion article's interest-balancing case against the right to elective abortion). 
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strength of those interests; and (3) presents _arguments bearing 
on which interest is stronger as a matter of "reasoned judg-
ment."69 
The ultimate question we are addressing is whether the wom-
an's interest in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus out-
weighs the state's interest in rescuing it via AW. Some of the ar-
guments I will be presenting address this interest-balancing 
question directly. In addition, however, two other interest-
analysis questions are especially relevant. As Part III.A argues, 
the woman's interest in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus 
is much weaker than her overall interest in an elective abortion. 
But this means that the state's interest in protecting the pre-
viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring its death 
unless that state interest is also much weaker than her overall in-
terest in an elective abortion. Part 111.C argues that this condition 
is not satisfied: the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fe-
tus is almost as great as (if not greater than) the woman's inter-
est in an elective abortion. 
Moreover, we know that the state's interest in protecting the 
viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in an elective abor-
tion (which is why the right to elective abortion ends at viabil-
ity).10 Given ·Part Ill.A's conclusion that the woman's interest in 
ensuring the death of the fetus is much less weighty than her 
overall interest in an elective abortion, it follows that the state's 
interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus prevails unless that in-
terest is much less weighty than the state's interest in the viable fe-
tus. Part 111.D will argue that this condition is not satisfied: the 
state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus is almost as 
great as its interest in protecting the viable fetus. 
A The Woman's Interest in Ensuring That Her Pre-Viable Fetus 
Does Not Survive Is Substantially Weaker Than Her Overall 
Interest in an Elective Abortion 
Under Casey, the right to an elective abortion rests on an in-
terest-balancing judgment that the woman's interests in having 
69. Because our legal tradition has never been faced with a situation in which the 
woi:ian's interest in ensuring the death of a pre-viable, but rescuable, fetus is pitted 
ag~mst the _state's interest in protecting and rescuing it via AW, this article does not ex-
amme the history of abortion regulation in the Anglo-American legal tradition. 
70. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion). 
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an abortion outweigh the state's interest in protecting pre-viable 
fetal life.11 Fetal-rescue programs are not governed by this judg-
ment, because the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the 
fetus is, for two reasons, substantially weaker than her combined 
interests in having an elective abortion. 
First, unlike prohibitions on abortion, fetal-rescue programs 
permit the woman to terminate her pregnancy, thereby avoiding 
the serious and invasive burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. A 
partial enumeration of the common physical burdens would in-
clude faintness, nausea and vomiting, tiredness, insomnia, short-
ness of breath, tender breasts, constipation, frequent need to uri-
nate, backache, edema of the feet and ankles, foot and leg cramps, 
varicose veins, hemorrhoids, mastitis, dry skin, irritability, de-
pression, loss of sexual desire, weight gain, the often severe pain 
of labor if delivery is vaginal, and the risks, pain, and scarring of 
a C-section if it is not. 12 As Donald Regan writes, "The ills of 
pregnancy, delivery, and beyond make an impressive list .... [l]t 
is an unusually lucky woman who does not put up with enough 
pain, discomfort and disruption of appearance and emotional 
state to add up to a major burden."73 As he also points out, these 
"pains and discomforts ... are likely to be significantly aggravat-
ed when the entire pregnancy is unwanted."11 The imposition of 
these physical and mental burdens on unwilling women has al-
ways been a linchpin of the case against laws that prohibit elec-
tive abortions. Unlike such prohibitions, fetal-rescue programs al-
low the woman to avoid these burdens by terminating her 
pregnancy whenever she chooses. 
Second, whereas prohibitions on abortion force the woman to 
choose between raising or relinquishing a child to which she has 
given birth, fetal-rescue programs force her to choose between 
raising or relinquishing a pre-viable fetus. The latter dilemma is 
less burdensome because the woman's emotional bond with an 
unwanted fetus will normally be much weaker than the bond she 
would likely experience with her newborn child.75 During the se-
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion). 
72. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1579-81. 
73. Id. at 1582. 
74. Id. 
75. See generally Carl M. Corter & Alison S. Fleming, Psychobiology of Maternal Be-
havior in Human Beings, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 93 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 1995) 
(explaining that maternal behavior and psychological attachment develop gradually 
throughout the duration of a pregnancy). 
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cond half of pregnancy, many women experience incre~sed ~a­
. ternal feelings toward the fetus. 76 Often, those feelings mtens1fy 
dramatically after the woman has given birth. Indeed, rou~hly 
half of the women who have decided on adoption before birth 
change their minds after birth. 77 
The likelihood and extent of harm to the woman's relationships 
and reputation should also be much smaller when she relinquish-
es her pre-viable fetus than when she relinquishes her newborn 
child. To begin with, it will surely be far easier, should she wish 
to do so, for a woman to conceal from the father or her family that 
she has had a pre-viability abortion and relinquished her fetus 
than that she has given birth and relinquished her child. Fur-
thermore, in many families and communities there are strong so-
cial expectations that the woman who carries a pregnancy to term 
will raise her child. There are no parallel expectations about the 
woman who decides to have a pre-viability abortion, and no rea-
son to expect such expectations to emerge in the wake of fetal-
rescue programs. And whereas the child's father and other rela-
tives may form bonds of their own with the woman's newborn 
child-bonds that would often be disrupted if she relinquishes the 
child-that is less likely to have happened early in pregnancy, 
even if the woman has told the father and other relatives she is 
pregnant. 
Yet even if relinquishing a first- or second-trimester fetus will 
typically be much less psychologically taxing than relinquishing a 
newborn infant, it seems inevitable that many women will expe-
rience it as deeply distressing. Some women become attached to 
their fetuses as soon as they learn they are pregnant, and this 
can occur even when the pregnancy is unwanted. 78 Quite apart 
76. Studies have confirmed that women often experience increased maternal feelings 
toward the fetus from about the twentieth week of gestation onwards. See id. That is sure-
ly one reason why the vast majority of second-trimester abortions occur prior to the twen-
tieth week. See Lilo T. Strauss et al., Abortion Surveillance-United States, 2003, 55 
MormIDITY & MoR'rALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 4 (2006). 
77. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents to 
the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 539 (2005). As one court ob-
served, "Experience has evidenced a host of cases in which a mother plans to give her un-
born child to adoptive parents, only to change her mind after going through child-birth 
and the resulting mother-child attachment." In re Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1193 
(Wyo. 1986). 
78. Some research suggests that women who suffer early miscarriages are as dis-
tressed when the pregnancy is unwanted as when it is wanted. See Jack P. Carter, Pre-
Personality Pregnancy Losses: Stillbirths, Miscarriages, and Abortions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
DEATH AND DYING 267 (2003). 
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from attachment, some women will be strongly averse to the pro-
spect that someone else will rear their child. Others may fear that 
third parties, or the resulting child, will attribute parental re-
sponsibility to them in the short or long run. 79 For all these wom-
en, fetus relinquishment may result in heavy and long-lasting 
psychological and emotional burdens. 
In sum, although the woman's interest in ensuring the death of 
the pre-viable fetus is substantial and lies within the specially 
protected realm of intimate decisions about the family and repro-
duction, it is also much less weighty than her overall interests in 
having an elective abortion, which include avoiding both unwant-
ed pregnancy and childbirth and the more burdensome postnatal 
version of the raise-or-relinquish dilemma. The question of how 
much less weighty obviously cannot be determined with anything 
resembling exactitude.80 But if the woman's overall interests in 
having an elective abortion are given a total weight of 100, it 
would be difficult to defend giving her interest in ensuring the 
death of the pre-viable fetus an average weight of 90-or of 10. In 
the context of avoiding postnatal relinquishment, a weight of 60 
or even 70 might be defensible. In the context of avoiding the 
raise-or-relinquish dilemma early in pregnancy, to go much more 
above half that weight range would devalue the difference in 
traumatic intensity between relinquishing a pre-viable fetus and 
7B. Writing in the context of disputes over IVF embryos, Glenn Cohen has argued that 
the putative "right not to be a parent" can usefully be understood as a "bundle" that in-
cludes three distinct possible rights-"a right not to be a gestational parent, a right not to 
be a genetic parent, and a right not to be a legal parent." I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution 
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Rights Not to Procreate]. As Cohen points out, however, this categorization 
does not exhaust the category of types of parenthood, in that there is a resid-
ual social category of parenthood-what I call "attributional parenthood"-
that remains .... [T]he law fails as a mechanism for allocating this kind of 
parenthood or, perhaps more accurately, it fails at unbundling this kind of 
parenthood from genetic parenthood. 
I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be A Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1135-36 
(2008) [hereinafter, Cohen, Right Not to Be A Genetic Parent]. Cohen's insight is that soci-
ety, the resulting child, or the parent herself (or himself) may assign general parental sta-
tus and responsibility for the child to a genetic parent, even if that person is not the child's 
gestational or legal parent. Id. at 1136-37. These attributions of parental responsibility, in 
turn, may be a source of emotional distress and reputational harm to the unwilling genetic 
parent. Id. at 1142-43. 
80. The numerical weights in this and the other examples in this part are meant as 
illustrations that help bring the critical factors for interest balancing into clearer focus, 
and are not intended to suggest that those interests can be quantified or that the weights 
in the examples are the "best" ones. I have, however, attempted to assign weights that fall 
within the range of intuitive plausibility. 
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relinquishing a newborn child. I will accordingly use 40 (out of 
100) as an upper-bound estimate of the average weight to be giv-
en to the woman's interest in ensuring the death of the pre-viable 
fetus in the context of fetal-rescue programs.
81 
We are now in a position to do a preliminary analysis of the 
constitutionality of fetal-rescue programs. The state interest a fe-
tal-rescue program advances-protecting the life of the pre-viable 
fetus-is the same state interest that would be advanced by a law 
prohibiting elective abortions. But whereas a ban on elective 
abortions frustrates the woman's combined interests in avoiding 
pregnancy and the postnatal raise-or-relinquish dilemma, a fetal-
rescue program frustrates only her much less weighty interest in 
not relinquishing her pre-viable fetus. This implies that fetal-
rescue programs are constitutional unless the woman's interests 
in an elective abortion greatly outweigh the state's interest in 
protecting pre-viable fetuses. For example, if the woman's overall 
interests in an elective abortion are again assigned a weight of 
100, and her interest in not relinquishing her pre-viable fetus is 
assigned a weight of 40, fetal-rescue programs are constitutional 
unless the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetuses is as-
signed a weight below 40. 
Moreover, under Roe and Casey, the state's interest in protect-
ing the life of the viable fetus outweighs the woman's combined 
interests in an elective abortion. 82 Therefore, unless the state's in-
terest in protecting the pre-viable fetus (beginning at conception) 
is much less weighty than its interest in protecting the viable fe-
tus, the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus must outweigh the 
woman's interest in ensuring its death. If the state's interest in 
the viable fetus is assigned a weight of 110 as against the wom-
an's overall interest of 100 in an elective abortion the state's in-
' terest in the pre-viable fetus prevails against the woman's isolat-
ed interest ( 40) even if it carries only half the weight it would 
have at viability (55). 
We have, then, three interest-analysis inquiries that can help 
to determine whether or not fetal-rescue programs are constitu-
81. For purposes of constitutional interest balancing, I assume that each interest is 
measure~ according to its average weight across the spectrum of women facing unwanted 
pregnancies. 
. 82. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opin-
um); Hoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). 
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tional under Casey. First, does the woman's interest in ensuring 
that her pre-viable fetus dies when her pregnancy is terminated 
outweigh the state's interest in rescuing it via AW? Second, do 
the woman's overall interests in an elective abortion greatly out-
weigh the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus? (Put 
differently, does the interest-balancing judgment that underlies 
the right to elective abortion present a close and difficult ques-
tion, or do the woman's interests easily and clearly prevail?) 
Third, is the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life much less 
weighty than its interest in viable fetal life? In turning next to 
how Roe and Casey characterize the state's interest in protecting 
the pre-viable fetus, I will refer when appropriate to each of these 
questions. Our ultimate interest, of course, lies in answering the 
first question. But, because Roe and Casey deal with the woman's 
overall interest in an elective abortion, rather than with her iso-
lated interest in ensuring that her pre-viable fetus does not sur-
vive abortion, those decisions have more immediate implications 
for the second and third inquiries. 
B. Under Casey, the State Has a ''Profound" Interest in Protecting 
the Pre-Viable Fetus 
In describing the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life, it is 
best to begin with Roe. The Roe Court rejected-as widely con-
tested and inherently unprovable83-Texas' claim that the state 
has an overriding interest in "protecting prenatal life .... on the 
theory that a new human life is present from the moment of con-
ception."8·1 Yet Roe accepted the state's "less rigid claim that as 
long as at least potential life is involved" it can invoke a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the fetus. 85 In describing the fetus as 
"potential life," the Roe Court did not suggest-nor could it 
have-that there is any serious debate about whether a fetus is a 
living organism, about whether that organism is biologically hu-
man (that is, belongs to the species Homo sapiens), or about 
whether it is genetically distinct from its parents. 86 Instead, the 
83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (invoking the lack of consensus on when normatively 
human life begins among "those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philoso-
phy, and theology"). 
84. Id. at 150, 153. 
85. Id. at 150. 
86. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) ("[B]y common understanding and scien-
tific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is 
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Roe Court's evident meaning was that the fetus is not yet a "new 
human life"87-that is, a normatively human being. 
Roe's terminology confirms this analysis:. the opinion inter-
changeably employs the terms "potential life,"88 "potential hum~n 
life,"89 and "the potentiality of life,"90 and uses them in contra~1s­
tinction to the terms "new human life,"91 "life, as we recogmze 
it,"92 and "persons in the whole sense."93 "Potential human life" is 
thus shorthand for what one might call "new life that will natu-
rally become a normatively human being if allowed to develop."
91 
Although Roe holds that the state's interest in protecting "poten-
tial human life" is not compelling prior to viability, it also con-
cedes that this state interest is "legitimate and important" as 
soon as conception is complete. 95 Roe thus permits the state to 
adopt in law the theory that "potential human life" begins at con-
ception, and to assert an important interest in protecting each fe-
viable outside the womb."). 
87. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added). 
88. Id. at 154. 
89. Id. at 159. 
90. Id. at 162. 
91. Id. at 150. 
92. Id. at 161. 
93. Id. at 162. 
94. .Jed Rubenfeld argues that Roe means something very different by "potential life": 
that the fetus is to be "considered solely as a 'potential' person," and not as a living entity 
in itself. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at 
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991). Thus, according to Rubenfeld, "[t]o under-
stand the fetus as a 'potential life' is not to understand it as an actual, but less than hu-
man, animal." Id. at 609. I have argued elsewhere that "Rubenfeld misunderstands both 
the relevant facts about human development and the construction the Roe Court put on 
those facts." See Gilles, supra note 68, at _, n._. For present purposes, it suffices to ad-
dress the latter point. Rubenfeld ignores Roe's recognition that abortion differs qualita-
tively from contraception because the pregnant woman "carries an embryo and, later, a 
fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus," 
and that, as a result, "[t]he woman's privacy is no longer sole." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. This 
entity-the fetus-is the entity Roe refers to in the same paragraph as "potential human 
life." Id. Clearly, Roe views the fetus as a "second biological life," but a life that is not yet 
human-in other words, "an actual, but less than human, animal." Gilles, supra note 68, 
at_, n._; Rubenfeld, supra at 609. And so does Casey. See Gilles, supra note 68, at_, 
n._. 
95. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (acknowledging that abortion is "inherently different" 
from contraception because the woman "carries an embryo, and later, a fetus," and holding 
that the state can reasonably "decide that at some point in time" its interest in "potential 
human life, becomes significantly involved"). Casey likewise describes Roe's "scope" as en-
compassing all "postconception potential life." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 859 (majority opinion); see also Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technolo-
gies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 848 (2007) (describing Roe as hold-
ing that "[a]lthough embryos and fetuses are not constitutional persons, states have legit-
imate and important interests in their development and potential for personhood"). 
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tus, understood as a new life whose nature is to become human if 
the pregnancy is not aborted. 
In limiting the right to elective abortion to pre-viable fetuses, 
the Roe Court asserted that the state's interest "grows in sub-
stantiality as the woman approaches term,"96 and becomes com-
pelling at viability, because the fetus has then acquired "the ca-
pability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."97 By the 
time the fetus has developed enough to be viable, there is no 
longer widespread disagreement about whether it is normatively 
human: the resemblance between the fetus's capabilities and 
those of a newborn child is sufficiently strong-and sufficiently 
widely acknowledged to be strong-to warrant recognition of a 
compelling state interest should the state elect to assert it. 98 Un-
der Roe, then, both the fetus's potential to become a normatively 
human being and its already-developed capabilities-which vary 
greatly depending on its stage of development-weigh in the con-
stitutional balance.99 Even in its first stages of development, the 
fetus's innate potential to become normatively human gives the 
state an important interest in protecting its life; at viability, the 
capabilities that enable the fetus to survive outside the womb, to-
gether with its continuing potential, 100 make the state's interest 
96. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. 
97. Id. at 163. 
98. See Nancy Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE 
L.J. 639, 643 (1986) (arguing that Roe implicitly adopted "the assumption that a viable 
fetus was one that was substantially developed and had reached 'late' gestation, and the 
ethical precept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective abortion can be 
forbidden"). As Rhoden suggests, the "dichotomy between late and early abortion ... is 
perhaps the closest this society has come to a consensus about the morality of abortion." 
Id. at 669. By the time the fetus is developmentally viable, the great majority of Ameri-
cans would view it as "new human life." See id. As I argue elsewhere, see Gilles, supra note 
13, the developmental viability line dovetails with Roe's argument that the absence of con-
sensus about when normatively human life begins precludes recognition of a compelling 
state interest in fetal life throughout pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-62. 
99. 'l'his perspective is not unique to Roe. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWAL'l', RELIGIOUS 
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 131-32 (1988) (suggesting that "the intuitive moral 
sense of most people in our culture is that both potential capacity and present or past 
characteristics matter"). 
100. One might surmise that the fetus's "potential" to become normatively human is 
exhausted at viability, because it can then be deemed to be 'actual human life.' But if we 
ask what caused the fetus to develop to the stage at which it is viable, the superficiality of 
this reasoning becomes evident. Over a period of roughly twenty-three weeks, the viable 
fetus develops from a zygote to a fetus weighing roughly a pound because its own nature-
including its innate genetic endowment-directed its development. And this natural ge-
netic endowment will continue to drive the development of the viable fetus, before and af-
ter birth, until it becomes a mature human being. 
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weighty enough to override the woman's right to an elective abor-
tion. 
Like Roe, Casey recognizes that the state could claim an over-
riding interest in protecting fetal life if it could demonstrate that 
normatively human life begins at conception. 101 Also like Roe, Ca-
sey denies that any such demonstration is possible. 102 On the oth-
er hand, both Casey and Roe acknowledge that the truth of the 
proposition that "potential human life" begins at conception is 
sufficiently clear that the state can assert a legitimate and im-
portant interest in protecting that life. 103 Under Casey, that is the 
premise on which interest balancing must be conducted: the pre-
viable fetus is not a normatively human being, but the state may 
recognize it as "potential" human life, and may claim an im-
portant interest in protecting it as such. 104 
Yet although the five Justices in the Casey majority reaffirmed 
that the state has a "legitimate interestD from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus that may become 
a child,"105 their coalition fractured when it came to the character 
of this interest and the weight to be accorded it. The controlling 
Casey plurality argued that Roe's recognition of the state's "im-
portant and legitimate interest" in fetal life was "given too little 
acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subse-
quent cases," and elected to "rely upon Roe, as against the later 
cases."
106 
The plurality proceeded to reject Roe's trimester frame-
work, holding that "in practice it undervalues the State's interest 
in the potential life within the woman," and replacing it with the 
undue-burden test. 107 And whereas Roe treated the state's interest 
as (at most) "important,''108 the Casey plurality described it as 
"profound."
109 
In short, the plurality opinion held that the state 
may assert a more weighty interest in the pre-viable fetus on the 
~O~. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality 
opm10n). 
102. ~ee id .. at 850 (asserting that reasonable persons can disagree about when new 
~uman life b.e~1~s, and that the state cannot by law "resolve th[is] philosophic questionO 
1~ such a defm1tive way th~t ~woman lacks all choice in the matter"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 
( We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins."). 
103. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. 
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion). 
107. Id. at 875-76. 
108. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
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same theory Roe permitted-that new life whose nature is to be-
come normatively human is present when conception is complete 
(or at such time thereafter as the state specifies). 1w tlustices 
Blackmun and Stevens would have given much less weight to the 
state's interest than the plurality; 111 but because the four dissent-
ing Justices would have given the state's interest even greater 
weight than the plurality, the plurality's position constitutes Ca-
sey's holding on this issue.112 
C. Under Casey, the Woman's Interest in an Elective Abortion At 
Most Slightly Outweighs the State's Interest in the Pre-Viable 
Fetus 
As we have just seen, the controlling Casey plurality opinion 
confirms that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life is ground-
ed in an understanding that the fetus is new life that is becoming 
human and that has an interest in its own future development, 
thereby affirming that this state interest is profoundly weighty 
throughout pregnancy.113 Standing alone, this does not prove that 
the state's interest in the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's 
interest in ensuring its death-but it does lay the foundation for 
that conclusion. 
We have not yet considered, however, Casey's implications as to 
the relative weights of the state's interest in protecting the pre .. 
viable fetus and the woman's overall interest in an elective abor-
tion. The previous analysis established that, unless the woman's 
overall interest is much weightier than the state's, her isolated in-
110. Id. at 871. 
111. Justice Stevens argued that the state has only "an indirect interest" in "expanding 
the population" and minimizing the "offense" to persons who believe abortion "reflects an 
unacceptable disrespect for potential human life." Id. at 914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Justice Stevens' recasting of the state's interest completely removes the fetus from the 
equation and leads inexorably to the conclusion that the woman's interest in an elective 
abortion greatly outweighs the state's interest in protecting "potential life." See id. For his 
part, J'ustice Blackmun claimed that prior to viability the fetus "cannot reasonably and 
objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, 
those of the pregnant woman." Id. at 932-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Webster 
v. Reprod. Heath Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Justice 
Blackmun's formulation treats the fetus as if it were merely part of the woman's body un-
til viability, when it abruptly becomes an individual rights-bearer. See id. 'l'he Casey plu-
rality disagreed, acknowledging that even before viability the fetus is a "second life" that 
can be "the object of state protection," so long as that protection does not "overrideU" the 
woman's rights. Id. at 870. 
112. See id. at 966, 979; see also infra note 123. 
113. See id. at 876 (plurality opinion). 
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terest in ensuring that her pre-viable fetus does not ~urvive ~he 
abortion must be outweighed by the state's interest m rescumg 
the fetus. As I will now argue, seven of the Justic~s in Casey w~re 
clearly of the view that the woman's overall interest in an elective 
abortion is not much greater than the state's interest in protect-
ing the pre-viable fetus. 111 
Only six of the nine Justices who decided Casey explicitly stat-
ed their views about whether as an original matter, the woman's ' ' . 
liberty interest in an elective abortion outweighs the states m-
terest in protecting the pre-viable fetus. 115 Unsurprisingly, .the 
four dissenting Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White, Scalia, and Thomas) argued that the state's interest ?u~­
weighed the woman's. 116 Of the five Justices in the Casey ma3on-
ty, only Justices Blackmun and Stevens defended the majority's 
affirmation that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests are not 
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion"
117 
on the mer-
its. Justices Blackmun and Stevens also joined portions of the 
joint opinion co-authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
114. My interpretations of the Court's abortion decisions, and of Casey in particular, 
are based on the opinions of the Court in those cases-which constitute the judge-made 
constitutional law arising out of them-and on the dissenting and concurring opinions, 
which stake out the official, public positions of the Justices who signed them. In turn, my 
assessment of the views of the individual Justices in Casey is based on the opinions they 
authored or joined. I have not relied on sources such as the papers of individual Justices, 
which might shed revealing light on their motivations and deliberations, but cannot alter 
the public meaning of their opinions. 
115. 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion). 
116. The dissenters' primary argument was that, contrary to the Court's usual sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence (and to any defensible understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause), Roe recognized an unenumerated fundamental right to 
elective abortion despite the fact that "the longstanding traditions of American society 
have permitted it to be legally proscribed." Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[O]n this record, it can scarcely be said that any 
deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the 
classification of the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process Clause of the 
Four~eenth Amendi:ient"). But the dissenters also argued that Roe was wrong even in its 
own mterest-balancmg terms, because it simply assumed that "what the State is protect-
ing is the mere 'potentiality of human life."' Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As the dis-
senters saw it, the Roe Court should have deferred to the state's reasonable judgment that 
~he fetu~ is "a h~ma.n life" whose claim to protection from the state outweighs the woman's 
mterest m termmatmg the pregnancy. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. at 846 (majority opinion); see id. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he Roe 
f:amework, and the viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively func-
tions to safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and 
accommodating the State's interest in potential human life.") (quoting Webster v. Reprod. 
Health ~erv~;· 49~ U.S'. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); id. at 912 (Stevens, J., 
concurrmg) (Roe is an mtegral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liber-
ty and the basic equality of men and women."). 
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Bout.er, thereby conferring majority-opinion status on those sec-
tions. But although the Casey majority opinion reaffirmed the 
right to elective abortion, and characterized it as grounded in a 
judgment that the woman's liberty interest outweighs the state's 
interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life, the joint opinion specifi-
cally declined to endorse this judgment on the merits. Instead, it 
explained that "the reservations any of us may have in reaffirm-
ing the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication 
of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of 
stare decisis." 118 As that statement implies, one or more members 
of the Casey majority had grave doubts about the soundness of 
Roe's central holding, and voted to reaffirm it only after taking 
into account "the force of stare decisis." 119 
In Part IV of their opinion, which Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens refused to join, but which constitutes the controlling opinion 
of the Court under the rule set out in Marks v. United States, 120 
Casey's co-authors acknowledged that "the difficult question faced 
in Roe" was "[t]he weight to be given th[e] state interest" in "pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life."121 As we have already seen, 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter went on to rule that Roe 
and later cases undervalued the state's interest in protecting pre-
viable fetal life. 122 Their explanation of their "reservations" about 
118. Id. at 853 (majority opinion). 
119. Id. 
120. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (ruling that when "no single rationale explaining the re-
sult enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that po-
sition taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds"') (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) Goint opinion)); see al-
so Carhart I, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (applying the rule in 
Marhs to the plurality opinion in Casey). In the twenty-plus years since Casey was decid-
ed, all of the Justices who expressed an opinion in Casey have agreed that the joint opin-
ion, including the portions joined only by three authors (the "plurality opinion"), as well as 
those joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens (the "majority opinion"), constitutes the 
Court's authoritative ruling. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 150, 156 (2007) (rejecting undue 
burden challenges to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 by applying the Casey 
plurality's undue burden standard); id. at 188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding an undue 
burden on the relevant class of women by applying the Casey standard); Carhart I, 530 
U.S. at 945-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding no undue burden under Casey); id. at 982 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding no undue burden under Casey's standard). Thus, subject 
to the usual rules distinguishing dicta from holdings and their supporting rationales, the 
entire joint opinion in Casey is binding law. This is because the three-Justice "plurality" 
portions of that opinion allow more state regulation of abortion than Justices Blackmun 
and Stevens would have allowed, but less regulation than the four dissenters would have 
sanctioned. 
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 
(1973)). 
122. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
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reaffirming Roe's central holding shows that, aft_er correcting for 
that undervaluation each of them found it difficult to conclude 
that the woman's in'terest in an elective abortion outweighs the 
state's interest in pre-viable fetal life. No Justice who thought 
that the woman's interest greatly outweighs the state's could ex-
perience any such difficulty. 
To be sure, Casey's co-authors, invoking stare decisis, declined 
to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when 
the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original mat-
ter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is 
insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when 
it is subject to certain exceptions.
123 
But although their reticence may leave some doubt about wheth-
er Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter each believed that 
Roe was wrongly decided as an original matter, 124 their "reserva-
tions" undeniably establish that they did not believe Roe was 
clearly correct as an original matter. Any uncertainty on this 
point is eliminated by the Casey majority opinion's elaborate ar-
gument that Roe's central holding should have "rare precedential 
force" because Roe "call[ed] the contending sides of a national 
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common 
mandate rooted in the Constitution."125 This argument would have 
been utterly superfluous had Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter each believed that the woman's interest greatly out-
weighed the state's. Indeed, their declared objective-ensuring 
that Roe's central holding remained settled law126-would have 
been far better served had they joined forces with Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens and reaffirmed Roe's central holding on 
the merits, while buttressing that holding with a "normal stare 
decisis analysis."127 
To summarize, in Casey, a majority of five Justices reaffirmed 
the right to elective abortion prior to viability on the basis of an 
interest-balancing judgment that only two Justices were willing 
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. 
124. See Gilles, supra note 68, at_ (arguing that the Casey joint opinion shows that at 
least one of its authors believed Roe was wrongly decided as an original matter). 
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. 
126. Id. at 844 (majority opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt."). 
127. Id. at 861 (plurality opinion). That is exactly what the Court had done in City of 
Akron v. Allron Center for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 & n.1 (1983) (reaf· 
firming Roe on stare decisis grounds); id. at 426-27 (reaffirming Roe on the merits). 
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to endorse on the merits, that four Justices argued was erroneous 
on the merits, and that the remaining three Justices believed was 
either erroneous or, at best, a very close call. These views were 
not mere dicta. The dissenters' conviction that Roe's central hold-
ing was erroneous, combined with the plurality's "reservations" 
about the soundness of that holding, altered the structure and 
reasoning of the majority opinion in Casey. Because only two Jus-
tices were prepared to affirm Roe's soundness on the merits, 128 the 
Casey majority was forced to rely heavily on stare decisis and 
"principles of institutional integrity."129 For that reason, one 
might argue that the plurality's reservations form part of Casey's 
ratio decidendi, and are therefore entitled to stare decisis effect. 
But even if not, the fact that seven of the Justices in Casey reject-
ed the proposition that the woman's interest in an elective abor-
tion greatly outweighs the state's interest in protecting the pre-
viable fetus should be given substantial weight in an interest-
balancing analysis under Casey. 
D. ''Reasoned Judgment" Suggests That the State's Interest in 
Protecting the Pre-Viable Fetus Is Almost on Par with Its 
Interest in Protecting the Viable Fetus or Full-Term Infant 
Let's now compare the state's interest in rescuing the pre-
viable fetus via AW with the woman's interest in ensuring the 
death of the fetus from the broader standpoint of "reasoned judg-
ment," which includes considering intuitions about the im-
portance of these competing interests at stake. We have seen that 
Casey follows Roe in treating the fetus as "potential human life" 
rather than actual, normatively human life. 130 Yet we have also 
seen that the Casey plurality opinion accords much greater 
weight to the state's interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life 
than Roe did, that Casey's co-authors were unable (apart from 
128. The plurality's "reservations" about the validity of Roe's central holding as an orig-
inal matter also altered the manner in which the joint opinion reaffirmed Roe's viability 
line. Although the plurality opinion invokes both stare decisis and Roe's own explanation 
of why viability is the tipping point when the state's interest can override the woman's, 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, its defense of the viability line is contingent on the assumption 
that the woman's interests outweigh the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life-an as-
sumption the plurality was unwilling to defend on the merits. See id. at 871. Thus, the 
plurality opinion depicts the viability line as the most defensible way to delimit the right 
to elective abortion, assuming, without deciding, the validity of the interest-balancing 
judgment on which that right depends in the first instance. 
129. Id. at 845-46 (majority opinion). 
130. Id. at 871, 876 (plurality opinion). 
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"the force of stare· decisis") to affirm that the woman's ~nterest 
outweighs that state interest, 131 and that it can fairly be mferre~ 
that they believed the state's interest was almost as gr~at as (if 
not greater than) the woman's overall interest in an elective abo:-
tion. This juxtaposition may seem highly counterintuitive. How is 
it possible to accept for purposes of constitutional law that the fe-
tus is not a normatively human being and yet be persuaded that 
the state's interest in protecting this "potential human life" is at 
least roughly on par with the woman's weighty interests in ter-
minating her pregnancy? 
We cannot be sure from their joint opinion how Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter would have answered this ques-
tion. Justice White's 1986 dissent in Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, however, expressly un-
dertook to do so. 132 Justice White argued that the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus even if Roe 
is right that the pre-viable fetus is not yet "new human life."
133 
His 
central thesis was that 
[h]owever one answers the metaphysical or theological question 
whether the fetus is a "human being" or the legal question whether 
it is a "person" as that term is used in the Constitution, one must at 
least recognize ... that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells 
all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the spe-
cies homo sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that 
species from all others.
131 
As a living human organism that is developing into a normatively 
human being, the fetus is qualitatively different from sperm or 
egg, and the fact that abortion "involves the destruction of the fe-
tus renders it different in kind from the decision not to conceive 
in the first place."135 
In Thornburgh, Justice White used this reasoning as a plat-
form to argue that Roe should be overruled. My goal here is a 
more limited one: on the assumption that the right to elective 
131. Id. at 871. 
132. 476 U.S. 747, 785-86 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 792-93 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the difference between con-
traception and abortion-the destruction of the fetus-goes both to "the weight of the state 
interest in regulat[ion]" and "the characterization of the liberty interest [as fundamental]"; 
id. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state's interest is compelling through-
out pregnancy). 
134. Id. at 792 (White, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). 
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abortion remains good law (whether solely on stare decisis 
grounds or also as an original matter), I will argue that the 
state's interest in rescuing the pre-viable fetus outweighs the 
woman's interest in ensuring that it does not survive the abor-
tion. And I will do so within the framework of Casey's interest-
balancing methodology, which calls for a "reasoned judgment" 
about the relative weights of the competing state and individual 
interests. 136 In arriving at a reasoned judgment on such matters, 
it is necessary to describe the grounds on which one's judgment is 
based, explain why one values pre-viable fetal life more or less 
highly, and critically examine why those who disagree arrive at a 
different value. 
How much weight, then, should we attach to state protection of 
the pre-viable fetus, understood as a living organism that is bio-
logically human but not yet normatively human?137 To evaluate 
the life of the fetus, we must start with the event that begins its 
life: the completion of the process of fertilization, which yields the 
zygote that is the first stage of fetal life. As Justice White saw, 
this event marks a dramatic, qualitative change-the beginning 
of a new, biologically human life. 138 Unlike sperm and egg, the 
pre-viable fetus is a genetically complete, biologically human or-
ganism. It is perhaps debatable whether sperm and egg are better 
viewed as specialized parts of the men and women whose gametes 
they are, or as distinct organisms "whose existence is fundamen-
tally oriented toward uniting with another gamete."139 What is not 
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (majority opinion) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudica-
tion of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Consti-
tution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: rea-
soned judgment."). 
137. My account of the fetus is greatly indebted to Robert P. George and Christopher 
Tollefsen. See generally HOBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A 
DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE (2008) [hereinafter EMBRYO]. Unlike their book, however, this 
article does not argue that "the human embryo is a human person worthy of full moral re-
spect." Id. at 4. 
138. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting). 
139. EMBRYO supra note 137, at 39. The fact that sperm and egg play a functional role 
in the lives of the human beings whose gametes they are-enabling those beings to repro-
duce-argues for considering them as parts, rather than distinct organisms. See id. at 34 
(arguing that sperm and egg are "parts of the human organism, the sperm a part of the 
male, the egg a part of the female"). The fact that sperm and egg are genetically distinct 
from all other cells of the human beings whose gametes they are-not only because they 
are haploid rather than diploid, but because their chromosomes are genetically different 
as a result of chromosomal crossover during meiosis-argues for considering them as dis-
tinct haploid organisms that will either die or be transformed through fertilization "into a 
single entity, the human embryo." Id. at 31-32, 35-37. 
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debatable is that neither sperm nor egg is a genetically complete 
organism belonging to our species. Sperm and egg each h.ave only 
one-half of the forty-six chromosomes that ·every somatic ce.n. of 
every normal member of our species contains.
110 
"This haplo1d1ty 
of the gamete cells distinguishes them from whole human be-
ings."141 No such distinction exists between the cells of a fetus, ~e­
gardless of its stage of development, and those of any other b10-
logically human being. Once fertilization is complete, the zygote 
contains the full complement of forty-six chromosomes necessary 
for a complete, biologically human organism. 
Possessing forty-six chromosomes, of course, is necessary but 
not sufficient to qualify the fetus as a human organism. Every 
somatic cell has forty-six chromosomes,142 but although each cell 
is biologically human it is not an organism. Rather, it is a part of 
a single human organism-the biologically human beings that 
constitute our physical selves. What distinguishes each human 
being, viewed as an organism, is that it is an integrated whole 
that "has the capability to sustain itself as an independent enti-
ty."143 The fetus possesses that capability as soon as conception is 
complete: if it can obtain "the resources needed by all organisms, 
namely nutrition and a reasonably hospitable environment, it will 
t . ( . d d d 1 "
144 
con mue assummg a equate health) to grow an e-ye op. 
The fetus's capability to grow and develop is inherent in its na-
ture:115 "It contains within itself the 'genetic programming' and 
epigenetic characteristics necessary to direct its own biological 
progress. It possesses the active capacity for self-development to-
ward maturity using the information it carries."146 More than 
that, the nature of the fetus is to exercise this capacity: "The hu-
man embryo, from conception onward, is fully programmed and 
has the active disposition to use that information to develop him-
140. Id. at 30. 
141. Id. at 40-41. 
142. Id. at 30. 
143. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, On Static Eggs and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems 
Perspective, NAT. CATH. BIOETHICS QUAR., 659, 666-67 (2002). 
144. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 41. 
145. In this respect as well, the embryo is radically different from sperm and egg, or 
from the nucleus of a non-zygotic cell and an enucleated egg, none of which can grow and 
develop without first combining (or being combined) to become an embryo. See id. at 52-
53. And even when fertilization (or somatic-cell nuclear transfer, in the case of cloning) 
occurs'. the gametes (o~ ~ellular components) "do not survive; rather, their genetic material 
enters mto the compos1t10n of a new organism." Id. at 53. 
146. Id. at 41. 
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.self or herself to the mature stage of a human being, and, unless 
prevented by disease or violence, will actually do so."147 The fetus's 
dynamic, self-directed biological development shows that it is "a 
whole living member of the species Homo sapiens in the earliest 
stage[s] of his or her natural development."118 
The pre-viable fetus is also the same living organism that will 
later become a viable fetus, infant, child, adolescent, and adult if 
its development is not cut short for one reason or another.mi Con-
sequently, the pre-viable fetus, no less than the viable one, has 
what Don Marquis famously termed a "future like ours,"150 in 
which it will have developed into a conscious, normatively human 
being who can actively seek his or her happiness. Like every liv-
ing being, the fetus has an interest in its own good-and it is good 
for the fetus to develop into a normatively human being, and bad 
for it to be killed before it can do so. 151 
As Roe and Casey require, however, we are assuming that the 
life of the pre-viable fetus must be regarded as less valuable than 
that of an actual human-"a personO in the whole sense," as Roe 
puts it152-because its already-present capabilities are not yet suf-
ficiently advanced. But the key question is: How much less valu-
able? Here, following Justice White's lead, I take issue with the 
popular belief that, once it is accepted that the pre-viable fetus is 
147. Id. at 50. 
148. Id. 
149. In the special case of monozygotic twinning, which can occur only in the first two 
weeks after conception, the embryo becomes two or more embryos, each of which will de· 
velop into a normatively human being. Some writers argue that until the possibility of 
monozygotic twinning can be excluded (around fourteen days after conception) the embryo 
cannot be regarded as an individual. See, e.g., BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: 
THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 50-51 (1992). Literally speak· 
ing, that seems true enough, but it also seems myopic from the standpoint of valuing the 
life of the early embryo. The embryo is a new living organism that will in most cases be· 
come one normatively human being, but that will become two normatively human beings if 
twinning occurs. That possibility would seem to make it more intrinsically valuable, not 
less. 
150. Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 191 (1989). 
151. Contrary to the common-sense view that ~very living being has an interest in its 
own good, manj writers on abortion have asserted that pre-viable fetuses are inherently 
incapable of having interests (or rights), because they are not conscious and are thus inca-
pable of having desires or preferences or of feeling pain. See, e.g., HONALD DWORKIN, 
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL 
FREEDOM 15-19 (1993); STEINBOCK, supra note 149, at 40-41. Because Casey treats the 
pre-viable fetus as a living being that has an interest in its own life, this article does not 
present an extended argument in defense of the common-sense view, or against the revi-
sionist one. 
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (197:3). 
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n t a normatively human being, it necessarily follows that its life 
iso drastically less valuable tha_n the_ life (and_ other important in-
terests) of a human being. This belief sometimes stems from an 
assumption that human bei~gs are ~he only ~iving beings the 
state can have an overriding mterest m protectmg on account of 
their intrinsic worth. This premise is highly debatable: many ob-
servers would endorse intelligent mammals such as dolphins and 
chimpanzees as counter-examples.
15
:i It is tr~e. ~hat a mature 
member of those species has far greater capabilities than a pre-
viable fetus. On the other hand, no dolphin or chimpanzee can 
match the fetus's innate potential to develop the full capabilities 
of a mature human being. If we are prepared to grant great in-
trinsic value to members of other intelligent species, we should 
assign at least as much value to pre-viable fetuses. 
Let us assume for argument's sake, however, that the state 
cannot claim an overriding interest in protecting non-human be-
ings. So what? The pre-viable fetus cannot be classified as a non-
human being. Whereas every other living being that is not pres-
ently a human being will never be a human being, the fetus's own 
nature impels it to become a human being. The fetus is sui gene-
ris: it is the one and only living being that is not-yet-human ra-
ther than non-human, because it is in the process of becoming 
human. Moreover, this process is driven by the fetus itself-its 
nature is to become human. It therefore seems incumbent upon 
us to assign greater value to the pre-viable fetus than we would to 
any non-human animal. 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to assign to the life of this not-yet-
human being a value that is only modestly lower than the value 
we assign to an already-human being (that is, one of us). Within 
the conceptual framework established by Roe and Casey, whether 
we should do so turns on the relative weight we assign to the "po-
i53. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREA'l'MENT 
OF ANI!',L'\LS 17-20 (1975); STEPHEN WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 144-54 (2002). The legal protection of endangered species-which is not 
predicated on a judgment about the intelligence of each species' members-supplies addi-
tional reason to question the claim that the state may only protect the lives of human be-
ings. Protecting endangered species often imposes great costs on human beings, and 
thereby demonstrates that the lives of non-human animals can in some circumstances 
outweigh even weighty human interests. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 172-73 (1978) (holding that the Endangered Species Act "require[s] the permanent 
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 
million" to ensure "the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all 
the countless millions of species extant"). 
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tential" of a human being as against his or her already-developed 
"capabilities." Those who would assign a much lower value to the 
pre-viable fetus will argue that it lacks the capabilities that make 
a human being normatively human, and that those capabilities, 
precisely because they are what distinguishes us as human be-
ings and persons, are worthy of much greater weight and respect. 
Once we attempt to specify these capabilities, the weakness of 
this argument becomes apparent. Given that Roe and Casey (as 
well as public opinion) effectively recognize the viable fetus as a 
new, normatively human being, 151 it cannot be argued that being 
normatively human requires the already-developed abilities to 
speak, reason, or exhibit more than the most rudimentary aware-
ness.10'' Unlike a newly implanted embryo, the viable fetus is fully 
formed, and many of its organs-such as its heart and kidneys-
are functioning. 106 But that describes the pre-viable second-
trimester fetus as well. 157 What distinguishes the viable fetus 
from fetuses earlier in the second trimester is primarily its more 
advanced lung and brain development. 158 Because there is nothing 
particularly "human" about our lungs-whereas consciousness, 
cognition, language, and emotion are seated in our 'big brains'-it 
is not surprising that some defenders of the viability line have 
tried to turn it into a proxy for brain development. 15n The difficul-
ty with this move is that the brain development that is crucial for 
viability is the brain's ability to maintain homeostasis, 160 rather 
154. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (majority opin-
ion); id. at 870 (plurality opinion); Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Lydia Saad, Majority of 
Americans Still Support Roe v. Wade Decision, GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.gall 
up.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe-wade-decision.aspx. 
155. Much the same could be said of full-term newborn infants, and consequently the 
argument made here does not turn on whether the threshold for becoming normatively 
human is set at viability or full term. 
156. Fetal Development Timeline, BABYCENTER, http://www.babycenter.com/O_fctal-dev 
elopment-timeline_10357636.bc (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 622 (arguing that at viability the fetal 
"brain begins to take on the cortical structure capable of higher mental functioning"). Oth-
ers have proposed that the right to elective abortion should end when the fetus becomes 
capable of organized cortical brain activity. See DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF AllORTJON 
116---29 (2003) (arguing that, even erring on the side of caution, this capability docs not 
occur prior to the twentieth week, and probably not before the twenty-fifth week). 
160. Defined as "[t]he tendency of an organism or a cell to regulate its internal condi-
tions, usually by a system of feedback controls, so as to stabilize health and functioning, 
regardless of the outside changing conditions." Homeostasis: Definition, BIOLOGY-ONLINE, 
http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Homeostasis. 
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than its ability to support higher-order activities such as aware-
. ness and thought. 161 
Nevertheless, by the time of viability, the fetus's cerebral cor-
tex has developed sufficiently that it may have periods of alert-
ness and may be capable of responding to experiences such as 
hearing music or human voices. 162 Yet these capabilities, divorced 
from the viable fetus's potential for further development, seem . . 1 163 
less impressive than those of many wild and domestic amma s. 
Indeed, as Kent Greenawalt has suggested, if most children "nev-
er developed capacities beyond those that newborn babies have," 
and those who would not could be identified at birth, it is unlikely 
that we would regard them "as having the inherent worth of de-
veloped human beings."164 It seems accurate to say, therefore, that 
when we treat the viable fetus (or, for that matter, the full-term 
infant) as a normatively human being, we are in fact giving much 
greater weight to its "potential" to further develop its rudimen-
tary capabilities than to those capabilities as they then are. And 
if this is so, consistency requires us to give equally great weight 
to the "potential" of the pre-viable fetus, which currently lacks 
those rudimentary capabilities, but whose future development 
will confer and then gradually perfect them. 
This point can be generalized: we value every biologically hu-
man life-whether that of a fetus, an infant, or an adult-not on-
ly for its present capabilities, but also for the continued develop-
ment and future life that still lies ahead of it. At least in the cases 
of fetuses and young children, the lion's share of what we value is 
their inherent, self-directed "potential" to continue developing 
and live a full human life. If the fetus is aborted before viability, 
it will never realize its potential to become normatively human, 
and will have been deprived of "a future like ours."
165 
For that 
reason, even assuming the validity of Roe's holding that the state 
161. This is demonstrated by the fact that profoundly retarded human beings can live 
for many years. 
1~2. ·~e~ ~OONIN, supra note 159, at 110-11, 128 (arguing that "organized cortical 
bram act1v1ty' pr?bably first occurs between twenty-five and thirty-two weeks of gestation, 
and. ~lmost certamly does not occur prior to twenty weeks); Note, The Science, Law, and 
Politics of Fetal Pain Legislation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2014 (2002) (fetuses "can re-
spon~ to s~und from 20 weeks and discriminate between different tones from 28 weeks") 
(quotmg V1vette Glover & Nicholas M. Fisk, Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and 
Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 881 (1999)). 
163. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 150-51 (2d ed. 1993). 
164. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 132 (1988). 
165. Marquis, supra note 150, at 191. 
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cannot claim normatively human status for pre-viable fetal life, 166 
the state should be able to assign great value to the fetus begin-
ning at conception, and to assert an interest in protecting the pre-
viable fetus that is only modestly less weighty than its interest in 
protecting the viable fetus or the full-term infant. It follows that 
the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus outweighs 
the woman's interest in ensuring its death. 
E. The Woman Has No Right to Ensure the Death of the Pre-
Viable Fetus If the State Is Prepared to Rescue It, and 
Recognizing Such a Right Would Place Inordinately Great 
Weight on Fetal Viability 
Imagine that, after the invention of AW, a new and untreatable 
virus infects a substantial number of pregnant women and their 
pre-viable fetuses. The virus normally causes no harmful symp-
toms to either the woman or her fetus. If, however, the woman's 
pregnancy is terminated in a manner that kills the fetus while it 
is still within her body, the virus will trigger a systemic autoim-
mune reaction that severely impairs her health. On the other 
hand, once the fetus is removed from her body intact and alive, its 
subsequent death will pose no danger to the woman. In this sce-
nario, infected women who wished to terminate their pregnancies 
would obviously prefer that a fetus-sparing method be used. But 
those who also wished to ensure the deaths of their pre-viable fe-
tuses would want them to be killed (or left to die) after the abor-
tion, rather than gestated in an artificial womb. 
Under these circumstances, few observers would deny that the 
woman could be compelled to surrender the still-living, pre-viable 
aborted fetus for attempted rescue by the state via A W. 167 Alt-
hough the woman might suffer serious and enduring emotional 
distress if the fetus becomes a child, that burden is outweighed by 
the benefit of allowing the fetus to become a normatively human 
166. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
167. See BOONIN, supra note 159, at 254 (rejecting, as "plainly unacceptable," the claim 
that "if the baby survived an attempted abortion, or was born prematurely, before the 
woman had an opportunity to have the abortion performed, then she would still have the 
right to have it killed"). I don't doubt that there would be exceptions. After all, some intel-
lectuals think that infanticide is morally permissible. See, e.g., Alberto Giubilini & Fran-
cesca Minerva, After-Birth Abortion: Why Shonld the Baby Live?, J. MED. ETHICS (2012), 
available at http://jme.bmj.com/contentiearly/2012/03/01/medethics-2011-100,! 11.full.pdf+ 
html. It is much harder to see how anyone could reasonably believe both that infanticide is 
impermissible and that it is permissible to kill pre-viable but rescuable fetuses. 
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being. And if this is true when the fetus is outside the woman's 
body, it should be equally tru,e whe~ the fetus ~s inside her bo~y. 
What matters is not the fetus s locat10n, but the fact that state m-
tervention can enable the fetus to realize its ·potential via AW 
without imposing on the woman the burdens of pregnancy and 
childbirth. Accordingly, this thought experiment confirms that 
the state may prevent the woman (and her doctor) from killing 
the rescuable fetus even while it is still inside her body, so long as 
the state provides AW at public expense.
168 
Notwithstanding her 
specially protected liberty interest, the woman is not entitled to 
kill the fetus when the state is able and willing to gestate it.
169 
It might be objected that this thought experiment is tainted by 
what is generally assumed to be a corollary of Roe's holding that 
the unborn are not Fourteenth Amendment persons:
110 
that any-
one born alive is a Fourteenth Amendment person, regardless of 
gestational age at birth. Intuitions about the still-living aborted 
fetuses in the thought experiment, the argument goes, are colored 
by the fact that we think of them as Fourteenth Amendment per-
sons because they have been born alive.
111 
Because Fourteenth 
Amendment personhood does not extend to the entity fetal-rescue 
programs seek to protect-the unborn (albeit rescuable) fetus-
our intuitions about the treatment of non-viable persons (i.e., 
still-living aborted fetuses) are beside the point. 
168. If, on these hypothetical facts, the state were to require any woman who had an 
abortion to pay the costs of AW for her aborted fetus, a very different question would be 
presented. Those presumably very high costs would deter many women from having the 
only kind of abortions that would protect their health under these circumstances (fetus-
sparing ones), and would thus seemingly interfere with the right to elective abortion in the 
same way as a ban on an abortion method that is the only safe method in some cases. See 
Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007) (upholding federal ban on partial-birth abortion 
method "given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe 
alternatives"). 
169. I am not arguing that there would be consensus for the proposition that it is un-
justifiable to kill the fetus after separation from the woman if it is pre-viable and AW is 
not available. In today's world, a pre-viable fetus that survives delivery or extraction from 
t~e wo~an's body will die from lack of oxygen, and may well suffer during the minutes it 
h_ves. Given these facts, some would argue that the deliberate euthanasia of these pre-
viable_ neonates is in their best interest, provided it can be done without inflicting greater 
sufferrng on them, and others would argue that even if deliberately killing such a fetus 
should be unlawful, it should not be treated as homicide. 
170. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. 
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United 
Stat~s ... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.") (em-
phasis added). 
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The short answer to this objection is that very few people de-
rive their intuitions about fetuses that survive abortions from 
their understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. The intui-
tion is more a matter of common sense: a still-living fetus that 
has been separated from its mother should be rescued if it can be 
rescued, whether or not its mother wants it to survive. What ex-
plains this intuition? A judgment that the good the state is seek-
ing to do-rescue the fetus so that it can realize its potential to 
become "new human life"-clearly outweighs the harm to the 
woman whose desire that the fetus die will be frustrated if the 
rescue succeeds. 172 
A similar intuition arises when we consider the difference be-
tween a fetus-killing elective abortion today, and a fetus-killing 
elective abortion to prevent the state from rescuing the fetus via 
AW. Today, when a woman terminates her pregnancy before via-
bility, the fetus will rapidly and inevitably die even if a fetus-
sparing abortion method is used. Therefore, no great additional 
harm is done to this fetus if the abortion is performed using a 
method that affirmatively kills it. 173 Should AW be invented, how-
ever, fetuses will be rescuable months before they become devel-
opmentally viable. If a fetus is rescuable-and if the state offers 
to bear the costs of rescuing it-the woman does impose great ad-
ditional harm on the fetus when she insists on using a fetus-
killing abortion method. For in so doing, she eliminates what 
would otherwise be the fetus's realistic chance of surviving via 
AW. Whereas currently the woman's refusal to gestate the pre-
viable fetus can arguably be justified on the grounds that she has 
no duty to rescue the fetus herself, no such justification can be of-
fered for her refusal to allow the state to rescue the pre-viable fe-
tus. Only if the woman has the right affirmatively to kill her pre-
viable fetus is a fetus-killing abortion justifiable under these cir-
cumstances. 
172. Beyond that, the objection's premise may well be mistaken. The Supreme Court 
has never defined what it means to be "born" alive for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, 
and the Court's understanding of birth, like its understanding of viability, may include an 
implicit developmental requirement. In particular, it is far from clear that the Court 
would hold that a first-trimester aborted fetus which will die in a matter of minutes unless 
placed in an artificial womb has been "born" alive and is thus a Fourteenth Amendment 
person. 
173. This formulation assumes that the fetus will be killed painlessly, or at any rate 
before it can consciously experience pain. 
1050 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 
[Vol. 49:1009 
To recognize such a constitutional right would c~eate . ~ dra-
matic and indefensible disparity between the state s abih~y to 
protect pre-viable fetuses and its parallel ability to protect viable 
ones. At viability, the state may prohibit elective abortions .alto-
gether-thus imposing on the woman a duty to gestat~ h~~ viable 
fetus, as well as to refrain from killing it. Prior to viability, the 
state would not only be forbidden to mandate that the woman 
gestate the fetus; it would be forbidden to override her insistence 
that the fetus be killed lest the state rescue it via AW. 
This enormous disparity in treatment is unjustifiable unless 
the state's interest in protecting the fetus is dramatically strong-
er at viability. As Part III.D argued, this is not the case: the 
state's interest in protecting the viable fetus is only modestly 
greater than its interest in protecting the pre-viable one. What is 
more, the development of AW will significantly reduce the differ-
ences between pre-viable and viable fetuses. Currently, they dif-
fer in two respects: the pre-viable fetus is less developed, and it is 
exclusively dependent on the woman for its survival. Post-AW, 
the pre-viable fetus will still be less developed. Thanks to AW, 
however, the pre-viable fetus will no longer be exclusively de-
pendent on the woman's uterus. That leaves the viable fetus's 
more advanced development as the only basis for assigning great-
er weight to the state's interest in protecting it. Even if more ad-
vanced development can reasonably be given significant weight, it 
cannot reasonably be given far greater weight than the unique 
potential to become normatively human with which fetuses are 
endowed regardless of their gestational age. 
Faced with the problem of defending a viability line that has 
such extreme consequences, pro-choice advocates may argue that 
fetal-rescue programs, even if constitutional as to fetuses that are 
a~proaching viability, are unconstitutional as applied to the first 
trimester, when the vast majority of abortions are performed. If 
Roe were still controlling, its assertion that the state's interest in 
protecting fetal life "grows in substantiality as the woman ap-
pr?aches term"171 would support this argument. But Casey con-
sp~c~ous.ly does not endorse Roe's dictum, and the Casey plurality 
opm10n is more consistent with the view that there are two criti-
~al stages in early human development-conception and viabil-
ity-than with a sliding-scale approach in which the state's inter-
174. Roe v. Wade, 4iO U.S. 115, at 162-63 (1973). 
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est incrementally increases from week to week. 110 On that under-
standing, the state's interest is as weighty prior to implantation 
as it is shortly before viability, and fetal-rescue programs are con-
stitutional as applied to fetuses at all stages of development. 
F. Whether the Woman's Interest Is Viewed as Avoiding 
Emotional Distress or Acting on Convictions About 
Responsible Parenting, It Is Less Weighty Than the State's 
Interest in the Rescuable Fetus 
In the final analysis, evaluating the constitutionality of fetal-
rescue programs requires weighing the life of the rescuable fetus 
against the woman's emotional distress if the fetus survives via 
AW. 176 Although there is no direct way to measure the weights 
that should be assigned to these opposing interests, the balance 
struck by fetal-rescue programs is more reasonable than the bal-
ance that would be struck by a constitutional ruling invalidating 
them. 
Women who want fetus-killing abortions will likely experience 
emotional distress if they must instead have fetus-sparing abor-
tions and relinquish their fetuses to the state for attempted res-
cue via AW. In some cases, aversion to that emotional distress 
will induce women to forgo fetus-sparing abortions, travel to ju-
risdictions where fetus-killing abortions are legal, or obtain such 
abortions illegally. These consequences attest to the serious and 
long-lasting nature of the emotional distress some women fear 
they would suffer if their fetuses survive via state-provided AW. 
Nevertheless, that distress is likely to be palliated by the fact 
that the woman can relinquish her ties to the fetus early in preg-
nancy, when her emotional attachment to it is comparatively 
weak, rather than after gestating and giving birth to it.177 Avoid-
175. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 869-71 (1992) (plural-
ity opinion). 
176. One might argue that the costs of rescuing the fetus include both the woman's 
emotional distress and the expense to the public of rescuing the fetus via AW, but by the 
same token the benefits include both the benefit of continued life to the fetus and the indi-
rect benefits to the public of a new citizen should AW succeed. 
177. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra, note 36, at 2-3 (detailing a 
birth parent's grief after giving up her child for adoption). The subset of women who de-
velop very strong emotional ties to their early-stage fetuses may also be more likely to ex-
perience guilt and regret should they have fetus-killing abortions despite the availability 
of AW. Put another way, some of these women may be so conflicted about their pregnan-
cies (and their fetuses) that they would suffer significant, long-lasting emotional distress 
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· g this level of emotional distress is an insufficient justification 
~~r deliberately killing a living being that could survive and be-
come a child via state-provided AW. 118 In balancing terms, it is 
unreasonable to assign less weight to the life (and future) of the 
fetus than to a single aspect of the woman's well-being that, while 
important, 179 lacks the life-changing quality of the postnatal raise-
or-relinquish dilemma. As Casey suggests, carrying an unwanted 
child to term, giving birth to it, and then, as a birth mother, con-
fronting the raise-or-relinquish dilemma may in many cases 
"shape" the woman's "destiny."180 Having a fetus-sparing abortion 
and relinquishing the fetus to be gestated by the state seems 
highly unlikely to have effects of that magnitude. 
But perhaps there is more to the woman's interest in ensuring 
the death of her pre-viable fetus than avoiding emotional distress. 
Several writers have suggested that women who seek to ensure 
the deaths of their fetuses typically do so for reasons of conscience 
that should carry especially great weight. For example, Leslie 
Cannold maintains that what she memorably describes as wom-
en's '"killing from care' decisions" stem from deeply held views 
about what it means to be a good, responsible mother. 181 Along 
even if the state simply offered AW as an option. 
178. Glenn Cohen argues that 
[w]hile compelled unwanted gestational and legal parenthood has obvious 
tangible effects on an individual, compelled genetic parenthood does not 
when it does not carry with it any gestational or legal burdens. It may cause 
emotional distress, but ... while an individual has an interest in avoiding 
these negative emotional effects ... it is not at all clear that we think that in-
terest is superordinate or of constitutional significance. 
Cohen, Rights Not to Procreate, supra note 79, at 1165. Insofar as the emotional distress to 
which Cohen refers involves only a woman's general desire not to reproduce, his analysis 
may be right (although query whether the right to contraception affords some protection 
from that emotional distress). But insofar as it involves a woman's intense aversion to re-
linquishing her offspring to be nurtured and raised by others, the analysis presented in 
Part IV shows that this interest does have "constitutional significance" under Casey. The 
decisive question, however, is how much weight to assign to this interest: for the reasons 
given in text, I agree with Cohen that this form of emotional distress should not constitute 
a "superordinate" interest as against the state's interest in protecting the pre-viable fetus. 
179. Although our legal tradition increasingly protects persons from the unwarranted 
infliction of emotional distress by others, in some contexts the law clearly assigns less 
weight to avoiding emotional distress than to avoiding physical or dignitary injury. For 
example, '''l'he privilege of self-defense typically applies when the injury threatened con-
sists of physical harm, inappropriate touching, or confinement," but "does not apply if the 
conduct in question threatens only to result in ... distress toO the victim." JOHN C.P. 
GOLDBERG, AN'I'HONY J. SEBOK, & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND REDRESS 652 (3d ed. 2012). 
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (majority opinion). 
181. See LESLIE CANNOLD, 'l'HE ABORTION MYTH: FEMINISM, MORALITY, AND THE HARD 
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similar lines, Stephen Ross suggests that many women see child-
bearing as "one of the more important things [they] ever do," and 
"want to do it in a responsible way; that is, only when [they] can 
raise [the child] in a loving, attentive, unambivalent fashion." 182 
For women with these values, Ross argues that abortion is "best 
seen ... as the only means by which they can regain their situa-
tion antecedent to pregnancy where there simply was no child 
and consequently no one with whom to either succeed or fail as a 
parent."183 Stephen Coleman agrees, although he concedes that 
because "the foetus is a potential person, some special justifica-
tion would appear to be necessary in order to kill it."181 Like Ross, 
Coleman finds this justification in the woman's urgent need to 
avoid "the special relationship" the fetus will have with her after 
birth-a relationship that will violate her sense of what it means 
to be a "good parent," whether she keeps the child or relinquishes 
it.185 
Distinguishing genuinely idealistic beliefs about being a good 
mother from self-serving rationalizations is not an easy task. I 
will avoid that problem by focusing on women whose decisions 
can rightly be characterized as conscientious. We then have a 
conflict between the woman's deeply held belief that her fetus 
should not survive the termination of her pregnancy, and the 
state's contrary view that the fetus is not hers to kill, but rather a 
future person (and citizen) the state is entitled to rescue if it can. 
Arguments that women should be allowed to kill their fetuses 
because they have deeply held ethical reasons for doing so fre-
quently presuppose that the fetus has no significant intrinsic val-
ue that society may recognize and protect. Coleman, for example, 
asserts that "the moral status of the embryo is very nearly the 
same as the moral status of the gametes that produce that em-
bryo, and that the developing human does not acquire significant 
intrinsic moral status until sometime well into pregnancy," when 
it becomes "sentient."186 This position is flatly contradicted by Ca-
sey's emphatic recognition that "there is a substantial state inter-
CHOICES WOMEN MAKE 135 (1998). 
182. Stephen L. Ross, Abortion and the Death of the Fetus, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 232, 
241 (1982). 
183. Id. 
184. STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES 132 (2004). 
185. Id. at 130-32. 
186. Id. at 105, 114-15. 
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est in potential life throughout pregnancy."187 Precedent aside, the 
arguments I have presented provide strong reasons to reject 
Coleman's value judgment and treat all fetal life as endowed with 
"significant intrinsic moral status." 
Some, however, might argue that even if the state may assign 
great intrinsic value to the fetus, the woman's convictions should 
tip the balance in favor of her choice to have a fetus-killing abor-
tion. Although Casey recognizes that such beliefs "may originate 
within the zone of conscience and belief," it also reaffirms that 
abortion's "consequences ... for the life or potential life that is 
aborted" demand that states be able to "act in some degree to fur-
ther their own legitimate interests in protecting prenatal life."188 
The conscientious character of the woman's beliefs helps make 
the case that her liberty to act on them should be specially pro-
tected, yet those beliefs are not a trump. Unlike prohibitions on 
elective abortion, fetal-rescue programs do not deprive the woman 
of "all choice in the matter"189 of dealing with her unwanted preg-
nancy. They leave her free to terminate her pregnancy, but forbid 
her to choose a fetus-killing abortion that would frustrate the 
state's efforts to rescue her fetus via AW. And they do so on the 
eminently defensible ground that the state's interest in preserv-
ing the life and future of the fetus is weightier than the woman's 
desire to "regain [her] situation antecedent to pregnancy where 
there simply was no child."190 
Moreover, however conscientious their beliefs, women facing 
unwanted pregnancies are subject to a conflict of interest that can 
distort their judgments about whether the gains to them from an 
elective abortion outweigh the harm to their pre-viable fetuses. 191 
To be sure, there is also a real risk that the state will enact overly 
broad prohibitions on elective abortions because the woman, not 
the state, bears the antenatal and postnatal burdens of pregnan-
187. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion). 
188. Id. at 852-53 (majority opinion). 
189. Id. at 850. 
190. Ross, supra note 182, at 241. 
191. 'l'his point is not confined to women confronting unwanted pregnancies. Devaluing 
the fetus serves our own self-interest (as persons whose personhood is beyond question) as 
well as the interests of persons we care about and identify with. See id. As one perspica-
cious defender of the permissibility of abortion has written, "We should ... be wary of the 
possibility of abortion becoming an unreflective practice, like meat eating, simply because 
it serves the interests of those who have the power to determine whether it is practiced." 
,JEFF MCMAHAN, THE Ennes OF KILLING: PROULEMS AT 1'HE MARGINS OF LIFE viii (2002). 
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cy. In the context of fetal-rescue programs, however, the state's 
judgment is less likely to be skewed: rather than requiring the 
woman to bear the burdens of pregnancy and child-rearing (or 
child-relinquishing), the state is assuming the burdens of gestat-
ing-and finding suitable parents for--the aborted fetus. Under 
these circumstances, there is all the more reason to permit the 
state to conclude that the gains to the pre-viable fetus outweigh 
the harm the woman will suffer if her desire to ensure the death 
of the fetus is frustrated by state-provided AW. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE REGULATION OF THE CREATION, 
DESTRUCTION, AND INDEFINITE NON-USE OF CRYOPRESERVED 
EMBRYOS 
The preconditions for fetal-rescue programs-the availability of 
fetus-sparing abortions and artificial wombs at all stages of preg-
nancy-do not yet exist. By contrast, in vitro fertilization and 
cryopreserved embryos are an established feature of reproduction 
in the United States today. 192 This part applies the reasoning of 
Part III to state laws regulating the treatment of cryopreserved 
embryos. 
Cryopreserved embryos are embryos that are frozen at below-
zero temperatures at the pre-implantation stage. 193 As its name 
suggests, cryopreservation can preserve the embryo for long peri-
ods of time, while simultaneously preventing it from continuing 
to develop. 194 Cryopreserved embryos retain the ability (once 
thawed) to develop and successfully implant at roughly the same 
rate as fresh embryos. 195 It is unknown whether cryopreserved 
embryos eventually become unable to implant or develop, but 
192. JOHN HOPKINS MEDICINE, Options for Women Before Treatment, http://www.hopk 
insmedicine .org/ gynecology_ obstetrics/specialty _areas/fertility _services/fertility _preserva 
tion/options_fcr_women_before_treatment.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
193. GEORGIA REPRODUCTIVE SPECIALISTS, Human Embryo Cryopreservation, http:// 
www.ivf.com/cryo.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
194. Melonyce McAfee, Ice Ice Baby: How Long Can You Keep an Embryo Frozen?, 
SLATE (Jan. 16, 2007, 7:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer 
/2007/01/ice_ice_baby .html. 
195. THE ONCOFERTILITY CONSORTIUM AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, Chance of 
Pregnany After Oocyte Cryopreservation, http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/oocyte-cryo 
preservation (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
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pregnancies have been reported from embryos stored for as many 
as twenty years. 1913 
It is estimated that there are now more than 600,000 cryo-
preserved embryos in the United States.un Disputes between bio-
logical parents over the disposition of their cryopreserved embry-
os have led to several state court decisions, 198 but there has been 
little, if any, litigation over state regulation of the treatment of 
cryopreserved embryos. 199 For simplicity, I will focus on a hypo-
thetical state law that aims to rescue cryopreserved embryos un-
der certain circumstances, and will assume that the biological 
parents agree about what should be done with the cryopreserved 
embryos they have created. The hypothetical embryo-rescue pro-
gram200 contains the following key provisions: 
It shall be unlawful to destroy a cryopreserved embryo that is ca-
pable of resuming its development after being implanted in the 
womb of a gestational mother. 
If the biological parents decline to pay the storage costs of contin-
ued cryopreservation, the facility where the embryos are stored must 
transfer custody of the embryos to the state. The state will pay the 
storage costs and will attempt to find a voluntary gestational mother 
for each embryo. 
If the biological parents are paying the costs of continued cryopres-
ervation for the embryos they created, but fail to arrange for the im-
plantation of the embryos either in the biological mother or some 
other woman within twenty years after the embryos are created, cus-
tody of the embryos must be transferred to the state, which will as-
sume the costs of continued storage and will attempt to find a willing 
gestational mother for each embryo. 
To prevent the use of the right to elective abortion to frustrate the 
purposes of the embryo-rescue program, it shall be unlawful to ar-
196. See Mara Hvistendahl, Baby Born From 20-Year-Old Frozen Embryo, POPULAR 
SCIENCE (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-10/baby-born-20-year 
-old-frozen-embryo. 
197. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Embryo Adoption, http://www.hss.gov/opa/ 
about-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
198. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that 
"decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers alone ... because no one else bears the 
consequences of these decisions in the way" they do). 
199. See, e.g., id. at 590 (noting the "uniqueness of the [issue]" and the seeming absence 
of litigation); Jennifer Hodges, Comment, Thursday's Child: Litigation over Possession of 
Cryopreserved Embryos as a Call for Legislation, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 257, 262 (1999) 
("Relatively little litigation exists surrounding the IVF procedure and the disposition of 
cryogenically preserved embryos."). 
200. In some respects, this hypothetical statute draws on Louisiana's statute regulat-
ing the disposition of cryopreserved embryos. See LA. REV. S'l'AT. ANN. § 9:121-9:133 
(2008). 
2015] RIGHT TO ELECTIVE ABORTION 
range for the implantation of cryopreserved embryos with the intent 
to terminate the pregnancy for the purpose of destroying them. 
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The first question that must be answered in evaluating the 
constitutionality of this embryo-rescue program is whether cryo-
preserved embryos qualify as pre-viable fetuses. As Part III 
showed, Roe recognized the state's important interest in "poten-
tial human life" beginning at conception,201 and Casey's descrip-
tion of Roe as "concern[ed] with postconception potential life"202 
reaffirms that understanding. Thus, whether cryopreserved em-
bryos come within the ambit of the state's interest in protecting 
fetal life depends on whether they are frozen-and their devel-
opment suspended-before conception is complete. The question 
of when conception is complete thus turns out to be the critical 
question on which the constitutional status of cryopreserved em-
b 203 ryos turns. 
To simplify somewhat, there are two competing positions. The 
first, endorsed by the President's Council on Bioethics, holds that 
conception is complete "at syngamy when the diploid embryonic 
genome is constructed from the chromosomes contributed by the 
sperm and the egg .... roughly twenty-four hours after penetra-
tion of the egg by a sperm."201 The second, for which some scien-
tists and bioethicists argue, is that conception is not complete un-
til the embryonic genome is activated and begins actively 
directing the embryo's development (a task initially performed by 
the fertilized egg's mitochondrial DNA and specialized enzymes 
contained in its cytoplasm).205 This development occurs at approx-
imately the eight-cell stage, "roughly forty-eight to seventy-two 
hours after insemination of the egg," when the embryo begins to 
grow in size (rather than simply subdividing), and when its indi-
vidual cells cease to be totipotent and cell differentiation begins.206 
Because cryopreserved embryos are typically frozen at the four-, 
six-, or eight-cell stage, they would clearly qualify as "postconcep-
tion" life for constitutional purposes under the syngamy definition 
201. Hoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 159 (1972). 
202. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority 
opinion). 
203. See Peters, supra note 18, at 199-200. 
204. Id. at 228; see id. at 212. 
205. Id. at 212-13. 
206. Id. Some scientists believe that the activation of the embryonic genome occurs 
even later. See text accompanying note 223 infra. 
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of conception, but would fail to qualify under the genomic-
activation definition. 207 
Although a comprehensive treatment of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this article, I will summarize the arguments for these 
competing accounts of when conception is complete, and explain 
why the syngamy theory seems more persuasive. In doing so, I 
will draw on the illuminating treatments of the topic by Robert 
George and Christopher Tollefsen, who argue that conception is 
complete "no later than at syngamy,"208 and by Philip Peters, who 
argues that conception is not complete until the diploid genome is 
activated, which occurs (at the earliest) at the six-cell or eight-cell 
stage of development.209 For ease of exposition, I will adopt Peters' 
terminology, which treats the completion of conception as the 
point at which "a new human embryo" has come to be.210 
The following basic facts are not in dispute. The process of con-
ception starts when a sperm penetrates the outer wall of the 
ovum.211 This triggers the division of the ovum's forty-six chromo-
somes into two sets of twenty-three chromosomes, one of which is 
expelled from the ovum.212 The fertilized egg-still a single cell-
now contains the full complement of forty-six chromosomes 
(twenty-three from the sperm, twenty-three from the egg) neces-
sary for the development of a human being. 213 During the initial 
stages of fertilization, the DNA in these chromosomes is chemi-
cally inactivated by the ovum's mitochondrial DNA, and devel-
opment is controlled by the ovum's mitochondrial DNA and by 
enzymes contained in the cell's cytoplasm.211 At their direction, 
207. Peters, supra note 18, at 217. The status of eight-cell embryos under genomic-
activation definition is not altogether clear, and might even turn on whether the embryo is 
in the early or late phases of the eight-cell stage. What seems clear, however, is that if 
only embryos with at least eight cells were deemed to be postconception life for purposes of 
constitutional law, !VF clinics could adjust their practices so that embryos were 
cryopreserved at the four- or six-cell stage. See id. at 200 (arguing that "laws triggered by 
conception should not take effect until the process of conceiving a new diploid embryo is 
complete," which "occurs when the embryonic genome begins to function ... at the eight-
cell stage"). 
208. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 38. 
209. See Peters, supra note 18, at 200. 
210. Id. at 199-200. George and Tollefson frame the question in terms of when "the 
zygote comes to be." EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 38. 
211. Peters, supra note 18, at 205. 
212. Id. at 206, 208. 
213. Id. at 208-09. 
214. Id. at 207. The sperm's mitochondrial DNA is destroyed after penetration of the 
egg, and plays no role in these processes. Id. 
1 
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the cell forms two pronuclei, one containing the "paternal" chro-
mosomes and the other containing the "maternal" chromo-
somes.215 Each pronucleus then duplicates its chromosomes, again 
in response to the cell's mitochondrial DNA and enzymes. 216 
After duplication is complete, the membranes of the two pronu-
clei dissolve, and the chromosomes migrate to the center of the 
cell. 211 Approximately twenty-four hours after fertilization, the 
two sets of maternal and paternal chromosomes align themselves 
to form two complete sets of chromosomes (syngamy). 218 The re-
sulting one-celled zygote shortly thereafter undergoes "cleavage" 
into two cells, each of which contains a complete human genome 
in its nucleus. 219 
Peters describes the situation at this juncture as follows: 
At syngamy, however, the newly assembled embryonic genome is 
still dormant. Activation will not occur until its nuclear DNA has 
been demethylated and the genes begin transcribing DNA. Many au-
thorities believe that this occurs at about the eight-cell stage, rough-
ly forty-eight to seventy-two hours after insemination of the egg. 
Others believe activation occurs much later .... at the thirty-two to 
sixty-four cell stage .... [or even at] the morula stage, roughly four 
to seven days after insemination when the embryo has hundreds of 
cells. 'l'hus, most scientists believe that the new embryonic genome 
takes control of embryonic development no sooner than the six- to 
')•)o 
eight-cell stage and possibly as long as several days later."" 
Given these facts, George and Tollefsen frame the issue as fol-
lows: "When is there a single biological system with a develop-
mental trajectory, or active developmental program, toward the 
mature stage of a human being? That is a question for which 
there is, in principle, a definitive scientific answer."221 The an-
swer, in their view, is that conception is complete "once the sperm 
has entered and united with the oocyte."222 The sperm breaks up 
except for its nucleus, which remains in the ovum; the ovum's ex-
215. Id. at 208-09. Although the "maternal" chromosomes are inherited from the 
mother, and the "paternal" chromosomes are inherited from the father, they are genetical-
ly distinct from each parent's own chromosomes,· due to the recombination of genes that 
occurs during meiosis in both sperm and egg. See EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 31-32. 
216. Peters, supra note 18, at 209. 
217. Id. at 210. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 210-11. 
220. Id. at 212-13. 
221. EMBRYO, supra note 137, at 39. 
222. Id. at 38. 
---- -."~ 
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ternal membrane (the zona pellucida) hardens to prevent fertili-
zation by another sperm; and the ovum completes its second mei-
otic division. 22:3 These changes, they argue, show that sperm and 
ovum are no longer "distinct organic parts," each with its own 
"distinct identity."221 
George and Tollefson recognize, however, that it does not nec-
essarily follow that when sperm and ovum lose their distinct 
identities, a new organism has come into being. Their argument, 
rather, is that the hardening of the zona, the lining up of the ma-
ternal and paternal chromosomes in preparation for syngamy, 
and the second meiotic division are evidence that "there now ap-
pears to be a distinct organism directing its own processes of 
growth and development."225 Accordingly, they suggest that a new 
human embryo comes into being even before the completion of 
syngamy.22(i But even if there is no new human embryo prior to 
the formation of the zygote, George and Tollefson maintain, the 
zygote unquestionably qualifies: it is genetically unique, its sex is 
determined, it has (two copies of) the full complement of forty-six 
chromosomes, and it is a totipotent cell that contains within itself 
all the genetic information necessary to direct its own develop-
ment.221 
Peters argues for a very different characterization of the em-
bryological facts. Here is the core of his argument: 
[Prior to activation of the diploid genome,] the development of the 
inseminated egg is not governed by either its original haploid ge-
nome or its forthcoming diploid genome. Instead, the transition is 
driven by materials in the cytoplasm of the egg. Thus, the period of 
transition is more aptly characterized as cytoplasmic than as haploid 
or diploid. This transitional cytoplasmic stage briefly bridges the 
boundary betwe~n8more important haploid and diploid stages in the human life cycle."" 
At bottom, this amounts to a claim that the inseminated egg-
even after it becomes a zygote-although no longer a functioning 




226. Id. at 38-39. 
227. Id. at 39-41. 
228. Peters, supra note 18, at 205. 
229. See icl. 
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Peters' view, there is no new human embryo until the embryonic 
genome begins to direct the organism's development.230 Only when 
"the new diploid genome assumes principal governance of the 
embryo's development" and "takes over from the maternal en-
zymes that directed development during the transformation from 
the haploid to the diploid stages of the human life cycle" is con-
ception complete-and only then is there a new human embryo.231 
Peters' account is both factually and morally unsound. Peters 
treats the new diploid genome as if it alone is constitutive of a 
new human organism, to the exclusion of what he calls the "ma-
ternal mitochondrial DNA."232 But although that mitochondrial 
DNA is ordinarily identical to the mother's mitochondrial DNA, it 
is misleading to call it "maternal"-as if her DNA were still di-
recting the ovum's development. Putting aside mutations, which 
occur roughly once per 1000 generations, the mother's mitochon-
drial DNA is genetically identical to her mother's mitochondrial 
DNA, and so on up the matrilineal line of descent.z:i:i For that rea-
son, it is more accurate to describe mitochondrial DNA as matri-
lineal DNA: it is neither unique to the woman whose egg has 
been fertilized, nor to the egg. 231 Both the ovum's "maternal" 
chromosomes and its mitochondrial DNA were contributed by the 
embryo's mother, but they are integral components of the ferti-
lized ovum while it is becoming, and after it becomes, a zygote. 2:i'' 
The "cytoplasm" Peters wants to treat as the basis for a third 
(and transitory) stage of human existence is the cytoplasm of a 
living cell that no longer behaves like a haploid ovum after it is 
penetrated by a sperm cell. 236 That cell behaves like a new organ-
ism whose mitochondrial DNA directs the assembly of its diploid 
genome-which will in turn direct the later stages of the organ-
ism's development. 237 
Nor does Peters ever explain why a functioning-in the sense 
of controlling-diploid genome should be a prerequisite to status 
2ao. See id. at 228. 
2ai. Id. at 2rn. 
2Cl2. Id. at 207, 21a 
2Cl3. Stephen Oppenheimer, Mitochondrial DNA: The Eve Gene, BRADSHAW FOUND., 
http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/journey/eve.html (last visited Apr. a, 2015). 
234. See id. It is not a distinctive attribute belonging to the ovum's mother-it is an 
attribute shared by the entire line. See id. 
235. Id.; Peters, supra note at 18, at 207. 
2:36. Id. at 205. 
237. See id. at 213. 
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as a new human embryo. 238 The maternal and paternal chromo-
somes do not direct the initial post-fertilization developments, but 
they certainly continue to function: they replicate themselves, 
they move, and they combine at syngamy.
239 
That these actions 
are carried out in response to chemical signals from mitochondri-
al DNA which was present in the ovum before it was fertilized 
does not prove that no new organism exists. On the contrary, it is 
precisely because the sperm penetrated the ovum, thereby trig-
gering changes that "activated" its mitochondrial DNA, that the 
mitochondrial DNA temporarily assumes this directive role. 
Peters also overlooks the nature of the "potential" that gives 
rise to a profound state interest in protecting postconception, bio-
logically human life under Roe and Casey. He argues that the fer-
tilized ovum's potential to become a child "seems insufficient to 
explain the normative role assigned to conception," because 
"[a]rguably, similar potential is created whenever a sperm and 
ovum are placed in the same petri dish," and yet "no one seriously 
argues that the selection of two gametes constitutes concep-
tion."210 This argument depends on an equivocation: when sperm 
and ovum are placed in the same petri dish it is likely that they 
will combine to form an organism that is capable of directing its 
own development and becoming a child. 241 But those who argue 
that the embryo's "potential" is morally and legally significant are 
referring to the latter meaning (potential as the capacity for self-
directed, organic development) not the former (possibility or 
probability). 212 Only after fertilization is the latter type of poten-
tial present. 
Finally, Peters argues that "[o]nly a functioning diploid genome 
confers on humans the potential to develop the higher capacities 
that make humans morally distinct."213 This is simply false. The 
e~bryo's assembled diploid genome already has the "potential" to 
direct the embryo's development, and it will begin to exercise that 
238. Pe~ers simply asserts that "[o]nly a functioning diploid genome confers on humans 
the potential to de".elop the. higher capacities that make humans morally distinct." Id. at 
227. I respond to this assertion below. See text accompanying notes 247-48 infra. 
239. Id. at 210-11. 
240. Id. at 220. 
241. See id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 227. 
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capability when the developing zygote itself "activates" its chro-
mosomes at (on Peters' account) the six-cell or eight-cell stage.211 
Thus, once the zygote is formed, there is a new, biologically 
human organism that has begun to direct its own development. 
As such, the zygote qualifies as a new human embryo-and as 
"postconception potential life"21 " for purposes of constitutional 
law. Consequently, the state has the same interest in protecting 
four-, six-, and eight-cell embryos that are cryopreserved by IVF 
clinics that it has in protecting all other pre-viable fetuses. 216 Un-
der Casey, the state's important interest in protecting "the life of 
the fetus that may become a child"211 extends to the cryopreserved 
embryo no less than to the second-trimester fetus on the thresh-
old of viability. 
The state's interest in protecting cryopreserved embryos obvi-
ously is advanced by a legal prohibition on destroying them. It 
would likewise be advanced by a requirement that the genetic 
parents of the embryos pay for their continued cryopreservation, 
and by a provision that the state will pay for their cryopreserva-
tion if the parents are unable to do so. But what about legal re-
quirements that the cryopreserved embryos be transferred to the 
state for embryo adoption unless they are implanted, either in 
their genetic mother or in another woman, within a certain time? 
Cryopreservation prevents the fetus from achieving its potential 
and becoming a normatively human being, and therefore impli-
244. Id. at 213. 
245. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (majority opin-
ion). 
246. In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), the Tennessee Supreme Court 
argued that Tennessee's trimester-based system of abortion regulation supported an infer-
ence that "the state's interest in the potential life embodied by these four- to eight-cell 
preembryos ... at best slight," and concluded that "the state's interest in the potential life 
of these preembryos is not sufficient to justify any infringement upon the freedom of [the 
biological parents] to make their own decisions as to whether to allow a process to contin· 
ue that may result in such a dramatic change in their lives as becoming parents." Id. at 
602. Although the Davis Court's interest-balancing analysis was conducted in the course of 
interpreting the state constitution, it could easily be recast as an application of Roe's sug-
gestion that the state's interest gradually increases throughout pregnancy. See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 162-63 (1973). The plurality opinion in Casey, however, not only 
declined to endorse Roe's dictum; it characterized the state's interest in all postconception 
"potential life" as "profound," not slight. 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). Moreover, the 
Davis court did not consider the respects in which the woman's interest in not becoming a 
genetic parent is less weighty than her overall interests in an elective abortion. 842 
S.W.2d at 603-04. Viewed as if it were a Fourteenth Amendment interest-balancing judg-
ment, then, Davis-which was decided before Casey- does not survive that decision. 
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion). 
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cates the state's interest in ensuring that the fetus has the oppor-
tunity to become a child. There is, however, a complication: it 
could be argued that the fetus is no better off being gestated now 
than at some point in the indefinite future. But no one knows 
whether there is a time limit on the "shelf life" of cryopreserved 
embryos, or, if there is a limit, what it is. Indefinite cryopreserva-
tion may decrease or eliminate a given embryo's chance of becom-
ing a child even if it is eventually implanted. By requiring that 
embryos be made available for third-party implantation, if the 
woman does not gestate them herself within a reasonable time af-
ter they are cryopreserved (e.g., twenty years), the state advances 
its important interest in ensuring that pre-viable fetuses realize 
their potential to become children. 218 
Let us now turn to the woman's liberty interest in deciding 
what will become of her cryopreserved embryos. In the abortion 
context, the woman's liberty overrides that of the fetus's father 
because she alone bears the burdens of pregnancy and child-
birth. 219 In the cryopreserved embryo context, those burdens are 
not present (although the burdens of obtaining eggs for IVF are 
considerably greater than the burdens of obtaining sperm). 250 'l'o 
bypass the complications that arise when one biological parent 
wants the embryos to be destroyed (or preserved indefinitely) and 
the other wants them to be gestated, I will assume that both par-
ents agree that the embryos should not be gestated. In the abor-
tion context, the Court has never suggested that the state would 
need a stronger interest to override the joint decision of both par-
ents than it does to override the woman's unilateral decision. Ac-
cordingly, I will focus solely on the woman's liberty interest in de-
ciding what is done with her cryopreserved embryos. 
The next question is whether the woman's liberty interest in 
~estro~ing or otherwise preventing the gestation of her embryos 
is specially protected. Technically, neither the right to use contra-
ception nor the right to elective abortion applies to the destruc-
2'~8. In additioi:, unless t~e biological parents are able to pay for indefinite cryopreser-
v~ti?n•. t~e state will be reqmred to do so. The state certainly has an important interest in 
m.1mmizmg such payments by arranging for the cryopreserved embryos to be implanted 
w1thm a reasonable period of time. 
249. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). 
250. The woman must.first receive hormone shots, and then undergo a surgical egg. 
remov.al process that requires anesthesia. See Sandra T. Jimenez "My Body My Right"· A 
Look into IVF Regulation Through the Abortion Legal Framew~rh 33 Wo'MEN'S HTS. L 
IWP. 375, 379-80 (2012). ' . . 
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tion of cryopreserved embryos. If the right to use contraception is 
the right to prevent conception-its literal meaning-it cannot 
apply to new, postconception life; 251 if the right to contraception is 
the right to avoid becoming pregnant, and thus includes methods 
that prevent an embryo from implanting in the woman's uterus, 
it has no application to a cryopreserved embryo, which poses no 
risk of implantation in its current state and location. 252 As for the 
right to elective abortion, the woman's right to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability has no application to the cryopreserved 
embryo precisely because she is not pregnant with it. 
Nevertheless, it seems evident that the woman's liberty inter-
est in not reproducing remains specially protected even when it 
does not fit within the categories of contraception or abortion. Ca-
sey's broad understanding of the woman's protected liberty en-
compasses the full range of deeply personal decisions about 
whether or not to bring children into the world. 253 Given that the 
woman has a specially protected liberty interest in ensuring the 
death of an embryo that is about to implant in her womb-or that 
has already succeeded in doing so-she must also have a specially 
protected liberty interest in ensuring the death of her cryo-
preserved embryo. 
How should we assess the character and weight of the woman's 
liberty interest in not becoming the genetic mother of the children 
her embryos may become if gestated by other women? She might 
want to secure that interest by having the embryos destroyed (or 
removed from cryopreservation and allowed to die). Alternatively, 
251. The Casey joint opinion suggests in dictum that Roe's concern with "postconcep-
tion potential life" is also "likely to be implicated ... by some forms of contraception pro-
tected independently under Griswold and later cases .... "Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992). This dictum appears to be a veiled assertion that the 
right to contraception lilrnly overlaps with the right to elective abortion prior to implanta-
tion, thereby providing an independent basis for destroying (or preventing the implanta-
tion of) pre-implantation embryos. A full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
article, but the joint opinion's unexplained dictum is inconsistent with both the standard 
dictionary definition of "contraception" as "the intentional prevention of fertilization of the 
human ovum," WEI3S'l'ER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 308 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d Col-
lege ed. 1980), and Roe's acknowledgement that once a woman "carries an embryo ... [t]he 
situation is inherently different from marital intimacy ... or procreation." Roe, 410 U.S. at 
159. In any event, even if the dictum were to become law, the interest-balancing analysis 
presented in this article would appear to apply with equal force to the right to contracep-
tion once the state's interest in protecting post-conception fetal life is present. 
252. See Robertson, supra note 50, at 499 n.162 ("Roe by its terms protects a woman's 
interest in terminating pregnancy. It says nothing about the right to cause the destruction 
of extracorporeal embryos."). 
253. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859. 
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she might prefer that the embryos simply remain cryopreserved 
indefinitely, or at any rate until she herself dies. Her interest in 
any of these alternatives parallels a pregnant woman's interest in 
ensuring the death of her fetus. The common ground is the emo-
tional burden she may suffer knowing that a child of hers is being 
raised by others and without her. But just as the magnitude of 
that emotional burden is likely to be smaller for the woman be-
fore viability than after she has given birth, it is likely to be 
smaller when the woman is not pregnant at all than when she is 
carrying a pre-viable fetus. 251 
Thus, the state's interest in the cryopreserved embryo is on par 
with its interest in the pre-viable fetus, and the woman's interest 
in destroying the embryo is no greater (and likely weaker) than 
her interest in destroying the fetus. Therefore, given Part Ill's 
conclusion that the state's interest in pre-viable fetal life out-
weighs the woman's interest in ensuring that her fetus does not 
survive via AW, it is a foregone conclusion that a state law for-
bidding the destruction of cryopreserved embryos is constitution-
al. 
The harder question concerns laws requiring that cryo-
preserved embryos be gestated by the woman (or by someone to 
whom she transfers custody of the embryos) within a reasonable 
time, or else transferred to the state so it can search for a willing 
gestational mother. As already noted, the state's interest in the 
embryo's realizing its potential sooner rather than later seems 
weaker than its interest in ensuring that the embryo is not de-
stroyed. 255 On the other hand, the woman's interest in blocking 
the gestation of her embryos decades after they were created 
seems more likely to diminish over time than to increase. Moreo-
ver, women who are concerned that their cryopreserved embryos 
may be seized by the state for gestation by a volunteer mother 
can either refrain from creating cryopreserved embryos, or can 
create no more embryos than they intend to use. In light of the 
uncertainty about how long cryopreserved embryos can remain 
capable of being gestated to term, the balance of interests favors 
the state on this question as well. 
254. See supra Part III.A. 
255. See supra note 247-48 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Roe, the principal claim made on behalf of the fetus was that 
it is normatively human beginning at conception.256 In Casey, the 
claim that caused the plurality seriously to question Roe's sound-
ness was that, even if the fetus is not yet normatively human, its 
unique status and value as "potential human life"-that is, new 
life whose nature is to become human-should outweigh the 
woman's interest in an elective abortion.257 Although the Casey 
plurality declined to address that claim on the merits, it unequiv-
ocally rejected the specious inference that, because the state may 
not treat the pre-viable fetus as a new, normatively human being, 
the fetus has little or no intrinsic value.258 Instead, Casey 
acknowledges that the state has a "profound" interest in protect-
ing the fetus throughout pregnancy.259 Under Casey, therefore, the 
specific question this article has addressed (i.e., "Does the right to 
an elective abortion include a right to ensure the death of the pre-
viable fetus?") turns on whether the state's profound interest in 
the pre-viable fetus outweighs the woman's interest in ensuring 
that it does not survive her elective abortion via state-provided 
AW. 
Although Roe and Casey imply that the life of a pre-viable fetus 
is less valuable than the life of an "actual" human being (a cate-
gory that may well include viable fetuses), 260 the critical question 
is "how much less valuable?" Although reasonable people will dis-
agree, the range of reasonable disagreement is not unlimited. To 
treat the life of a pre-viable fetus as dramatically and dispropor-
tionately less valuable than the life of a viable fetus or an infant 
is outside the range of reasonable disagreement, as well as incon-
sistent with Casey. 
Because of the limitations of current technology, to prohibit 
elective abortion means demanding both that the woman bear the 
heavy burdens of an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, and 
that, having done so, she face the dilemma or raising or relin-
256. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. 
257. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion). 
258. See id. 
259. See id. at 878. 
260. See Rubenfeld, supra note 94 at 635 ("[D]espite its vocabulary of potential life, the 
Court in all essential respects made a determination about when the states could deem 
the fetus a person." (i.e., at viability)). 
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quishing her own newborn child. These are great sacrifices, as 
Casey correctly realized, and thus-granting the premise that the 
fetus is not yet normatively human-it is arguably reasonable to 
conclude that the woman's interest in avoiding them outweighs 
the state's interest in enabling the fetus to realize its potential to 
become a normatively human being. 261 This article has imagined, 
however, that it will someday become possible to terminate a 
pregnancy in a way that is safe for the woman, while still ena-
bling the fetus to survive the abortion and to develop to full term 
in an artificial womb. If under these circumstances the state pro-
hibits fetus-killing abortions and requires that surviving fetuses 
be transferred to the state for attempted rescue in an artificial 
womb, it will not be possible reasonably to conclude that the 
woman's interest in a fetus-killing abortion outweighs the state's 
interest in the life of the pre-viable fetus. The state will no longer 
be requiring the woman to make the sacrifices involved in preg-
nancy and childbirth; and while it will be requiring her to relin-
quish her offspring to the state for attempted rescue, that is a far 
less traumatic separation than a birth mother's relinquishment of 
her newborn infant. Granted, by forbidding the woman to direct 
that her fetus be killed before or during the termination of her 
pregnancy, the state is requiring her to bear emotional burdens 
that can be heavy and long-lasting. But to treat these burdens as 
outweighing the life of the fetus that will by nature become a 
human being if AW succeeds is implicitly to devalue fetal life far 
more than Casey requires states to do when regulating elective 
abortions. 
This reasoning leads ineluctably to the conclusion that states 
should also be free to forbid the destruction or indefinite disuse of 
cryopreserved embryos. Under Casey, the state has a "profound 
interest" in protecting all postconception life, 262 and cryopreserved 
embryos fall within that category. No less than the implanted fe-
tus, the cryopreserved embryo is new life that will by nature be-
come a normatively human being. The woman's interest in pre-
venting its development is, if anything, weaker than her interest 
in ensuring the death of her pre-viable fetus. And the very fact 
that cryopreserved embryos are deliberately created strengthens 
261. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. But see Gilles, supra note 13 (arguing that the state's in-
terest in protecting the previable fetus outweighs the woman's interests in an elective 
abortion). 
262. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
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the case for forbidding the woman to destroy them or prevent the 
state from rescuing them should the passage of time make it rea-
sonably certain that she will never gestate them herself. 
